Robust Pricing in Dynamic Mechanism Design

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Abstract
Motivated by the repeated sale of online ads via auctions, optimal pricing in repeated auctions has attracted a large body of research. While dynamic mechanisms offer powerful techniques to improve on both revenue and efficiency by optimizing auctions across different items, their reliance on exact distributional information of buyers’ valuations (present and future) limits their use in practice. In this paper, we propose robust dynamic mechanism design. We develop a new framework to design dynamic mechanisms that are robust to both estimation errors in value distributions and strategic behavior. We apply the framework in learning environments, leading to the first policy that achieves provably low regret against the optimal dynamic mechanism in contextual auctions, where the dynamic benchmark has full and accurate distributional information.

1. Introduction
Motivated by the popularity of selling online ads via auctions, pricing in dynamic auctions has been extensively studied in recent years. Dynamic auctions open up the possibility of linking the auction rules and payments across time to enhance revenue or welfare. Formally, dynamic mechanism design considers an environment in which the seller has exact distributional information over the buyers’ values for the items, for the current stage and all future stages, and designs revenue-maximizing dynamic mechanisms that adapt the auction rules based on the buyer’s historical bids (Thomas & Worrall, 1990; Bergemann & Välimäki, 2010; Ashlagi et al., 2016; Mirrokni et al., 2016a; 2018; Deng et al., 2019b).

This line of study provides simple dynamic mechanisms, in terms of descriptive complexity, that compare favorably to the revenue-optimal dynamic benchmark. However, these mechanisms are clairvoyant and rely on exact knowledge of future value distributions to align buyers’ incentives (across time) and guarantee desirable outcomes. This strong requirement limits the application of dynamic auctions in practice because the seller may only have access to approximate models of distributions. As one attempt to address this concern, Mirrokni et al. (2018) consider another extreme and propose non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms, which do not rely on any information about the future. They show that a non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism can achieve a constant approximation of the revenue-optimal clairvoyant dynamic mechanism that knows the future in advance.

In this work we take an intermediate stance where the designer can model present and future distributional information subject to an estimation error. Designing revenue-optimal and incentive-compatible auctions in this framework is challenging for the following reason: when the seller’s distributional information is not perfectly aligned with the buyer’s true value distributions, it is impossible for the seller to offer a prior-dependent dynamic mechanism in which the optimal strategy for the buyer is to report her valuation truthfully at every stage (i.e., dynamic incentive-compatible). Furthermore, in a dynamic mechanism the buyer’s misreport can potentially affect auctions for all future items. We overcome these obstacles and provide a robust dynamic mechanism where the extent of the buyers’ misreports and the revenue loss can be related to and bounded by the estimation error of the buyers’ distributions.

We then apply our robust dynamic mechanism to the problem of robust price learning. In particular, we focus on contextual auctions, where a buyer’s valuation for an item depends on the context that describes the item, but the relationship between the buyer’s valuation and the context is unknown to the seller. The seller’s task is to design a policy to adapt the mechanism based on the buyer’s historical bids, with the objective of maximizing revenue. Previous results (Amin et al., 2014; Golrezaei et al., 2019) give a no-regret policy against the optimal static mechanism in which the auction ignores the history and does not evolve over time. However, Papadimitriou et al. (2016) have shown that the revenue gap between optimal static and dynamic mechanisms can be arbitrarily large. We tailor the structure of our robust dynamic mechanism to a learning environment, leading to a no-regret policy against the optimal clairvoyant contextual auction that knows the relationship in advance.
Related Work

Our work is closely related to the recent work by Deng et al. (2019a), which provides a robust dynamic mechanism design framework for the non-clairvoyant environment. They provide a no-regret policy in contextual auctions against a constant approximation of the optimal clairvoyant mechanism. In contrast, we provide a robust dynamic mechanism design framework for the clairvoyant environment and design a no-regret policy against the optimal clairvoyant contextual auction without any approximation.

Moreover, robust dynamic mechanism design for the clairvoyant environment is more challenging than robust dynamic mechanism design for the non-clairvoyant environment. In a non-clairvoyant environment, there exists a concrete dynamic mechanism from Mirrokni et al. (2018), which is a mixture of the give-for-free auction, the posted-price auction with an entry fee, and the Myerson’s auction. Using such a concrete mechanism as a starting point, one only needs to provide a framework to make this mechanism robust (Deng et al., 2019a). In contrast, we consider a clairvoyant environment, and the revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism (with perfect prior knowledge) is given by a convex program based dynamic program, i.e., it is computed via a dynamic program in which each transition is computed by a convex program (see Section 3.3). To overcome the difficulty of analyzing a convex program based dynamic program, we both develop new technical tools for analysis and provide structural insights of its optimal solution.

Dynamic Mechanism Design. For a review of the literature, readers are encouraged to refer to (Bergemann & Välimäki, 2019) for a comprehensive survey. Bergemann & Välimäki (2010) propose a generalized VCG mechanism to the dynamic environment where the buyers receive private information over time, called the dynamic pivot mechanism, which achieves welfare-maximizing outcomes. Kakade et al. (2013) combine the dynamic pivot mechanism and the virtual valuation idea (Myerson, 1981) to design a virtual-pivot mechanism. Athey & Segal (2013) propose a team mechanism that is efficient and budget-balanced.

The line of research on revenue-maximizing dynamic mechanism design was initiated by Baron & Besanko (1984) and Courty & Hao (2000). Pavan et al. (2014) generalize the Myersonian approach (Myerson, 1981) to the dynamic setting and provide characterizations of dynamic incentive-compatibility. Papadimitriou et al. (2016) provide an example that demonstrates the revenue gap between the static and dynamic mechanism can be arbitrarily large. Moreover, they show that it is NP-Hard to design the optimal deterministic auctions even in a dynamic environment with a single buyer and two items only. Ashlagi et al. (2016) and Mirrokni et al. (2016b) independently provide fully polynomial-time approximation schemes to compute the optimal randomized mechanism. Our work is mainly built on top of the framework of bank account mechanisms from (Mirrokni et al., 2018; Deng et al., 2019b), which relies on exact knowledge of valuation distributions. They provide a general framework to design the revenue-maximizing dynamic mechanism, called bank account mechanisms. Inspired by the framework, Deng & Lahaie (2019) and Deng et al. (2020) provide statistical tools to test and measure dynamic incentive compatibility. However, such a framework considers a setting where the seller has a perfect information about the buyer’s distributions. In contrast, our robust dynamic mechanism works in an environment where the seller’s distributional information is not perfect.

Robust Price Learning. Our work is also related to dynamic pricing with learning (see den Boer (2015) for a recent survey). There has been a growing body of literature on price learning with non-strategic buyers (Cohen et al., 2016; Lobel et al., 2018; Leme & Schneider, 2018; Mao et al., 2018). In their models, the buyers have fixed valuations and are non-strategic, and therefore, the problem can be reduced to a one-shot auction where the buyer acts myopically without considering future. However, Edelman & Ostrovsky (2007) provide empirical evidence that the buyers participating in the online advertising markets do act strategically. The study of robust price learning with strategic buyers was initiated by Amin et al. (2013) and Medina & Mohri (2014). When the valuations are fixed and the buyers are impatient, the revenue regret has been shown to be $\Theta(\log \log T)$ by Drutsa (2017; 2018). For learning in the contextual auctions, Amin et al. (2014) develop a no-regret policy in a setting without market noise. Recently, Golrezaei et al. (2019) enrich the model by incorporating market noise. All of these results are no-regret against optimal static mechanisms that ignore the history, while our policy is no-regret against optimal dynamic mechanisms.

2. Preliminaries

A dynamic auction model describes an environment where a seller (he) sells a stream of $T$ items that arrive online, based on the reports by strategic buyers. In an online environment, an item must be sold once it arrives. For the sake of clarity, we will focus on the case with a single buyer (she). Our results can be extended to multi-buyer settings by using the techniques from Cai et al. (2012).

In line with the literature (Deng et al., 2019a), the $t$-th item arrives at stage $t$ and the buyer’s valuation $v_t \in [0, a_t]$ is drawn independently (but not necessarily identically) according to the cumulative distribution function $F_t$. We assume that the density function $f_t$ of $F_t$ is upper bounded by $c_f/a_t$ where $c_f$ is a constant. The domain bounds $a_t$ are public and enrich the model to reflect the fact that item valuations may have different scales. We normalize the domain...
Assumption 2.1. After the buyer learns her valuation $v_t$, at the beginning of stage $t$, she then submits a bid $b_t$ to the seller who then implements an outcome with an allocation probability and a payment. We restrict our attention to the case where the bid $b_t$ is always in the set $V_t = \{0, a_t\}$. For convenience, let $V^t = \prod_{t'=1}^t V_{t'}$ be the set of all possible sequences of the buyer’s bids for the first $t$ stages. Similarly, let $\Delta V_t$ be the set of distributions over $V_t$ and let $(\Delta V)^t = \prod_{t'=1}^t (\Delta V_{t'})$ be the set of all possible sequences of distributions for the first $t$ stages. For convenience, we use the notation $a_{t'}(t', t'')$ to represent a sequence $(a_{t'}, \ldots, a_{t''})$ of $a$ between stage $t'$ and stage $t''$. In general, a clairvoyant mechanism can be characterized by a sequence of allocation and payment functions: (1) the allocation function maps historical bids and seller’s distributional information $\hat{F}_{1,T}$ to an allocation probability: $x_t : V^t \times (\Delta V)^T \rightarrow [0, 1]$; (2) the payment function maps historical bids and seller’s distributional information $\hat{F}_{1,T}$ to a payment: $p_t : V^t \times (\Delta V)^T \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Given $b_{1,t}$ and $\hat{F}_{1,T}$, the utility $u_t$ of the buyer with true valuation $v_t$ is $u_t(v_t; b_{1,t}; \hat{F}_{1,T}) = v_t \cdot x_t(b_{1,t}; \hat{F}_{1,T}) - p_t(b_{1,t}; \hat{F}_{1,T})$. A dynamic mechanism is non-clairvoyant if no prior knowledge about future stages is available, and therefore, the allocation rule and the payment rule of a non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism at stage $t$ can only depend on $\hat{F}_{1,t}$ and $b_{1,t}$. We will focus on how to make the revenue-optimal clairvoyant mechanism robust.

Estimated Distributional Information. Following the setup in (Deng et al., 2019a), we relax the standard assumption of exact distributional information (Ashlagi et al., 2016; Mirrokni et al., 2018; Deng et al., 2019b) and consider an environment where the seller’s distributional information is estimated with an error $\Delta$.

Assumption 2.1 (Deng et al. (2019a)). There exists a coupling between a random draw $v_t$ from $F_t$ and a random draw $\hat{v}_t$ from $\hat{F}_t$ such that $v_t = \hat{v}_t + a_t \cdot \epsilon_t$ with $\epsilon_t \in [-\Delta, \Delta]$.

The assumption states that samples from the estimated distribution have a bounded bias. Looking ahead to our application into contextual auctions, such a bias comes from that the seller does not have perfect information about the relationship between the buyer’s valuation and the context.

Utility-maximizing Buyer. We assume the buyer’s valuation is additive across items. At stage $t$, the buyer aims at maximizing her time-discounted cumulative expected utility $
abla \sum_{t'=1}^T \gamma^{t'-t} \cdot E[u_t]$, where $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ is the discounting factor and the expectation is taken with respect to the true distribution $F_{1,T}$. The discounting factor implies that the buyer is less patient than the seller. We note that Amin et al. (2013) showed that it is impossible to obtain a no-regret policy when the buyer is as patient as the seller.

Incentive Constraints. The buyer’s best response in a dynamic mechanism depends on her strategy in future stages. When the seller has perfect distributional information, the classic notion of dynamic incentive-compatibility (DIC) requires that reporting truthfully is always the buyer’s optimal strategy, assuming that she plays optimally in the future (Mirrokni et al., 2018). However, exact DIC is no longer possible to achieve in prior-dependent dynamic mechanisms when the seller only has approximate distributional information. We consider $\eta(1,T)$-approximate DIC (Deng et al., 2019a): assuming the buyer plays optimally in the future (optimally now no longer means truthfully), the buyer’s bid should deviate from $v_t$ by at most $\eta_t$ at stage $t$. Formally, there exists $\hat{b}_t \in [v_t - \eta_t, v_t + \eta_t]$ that belongs to

\[
\arg \max_{b_t} u_t(v_t; b_{1,t}; \hat{F}_{1,T}) + \gamma \cdot U_t(b_{1,t}; F_{1,T}; \hat{F}_{1,T}) (\eta(1,T)\text{-DIC})
\]

for all $v_t, b_{(1..t-1)}$. Here $U_t(b_{1,t}; F_{1,T}; \hat{F}_{1,T})$ is the continuation utility that the buyer obtains in the future: for $t < T$, $U_t(b_{1,t}; F_{1,T}; \hat{F}_{1,T})$ is defined recursively as

\[
\mathbb{E}_{v_{t+1} \sim F_{t+1}} \left[ \max_{b_{t+1}} u_{t+1}(v_{t+1}; b_{1,t+1}; \hat{F}_{1,T}) + \gamma \cdot U_{t+1}(b_{1,t+1}; F_{1,T}; \hat{F}_{1,T}) \right];
\]

while $U_T(b_{1,T}; F_{1,T}; \hat{F}_{1,T}) = 0$.

Participation Constraints. We assume that the buyer weights realized past utilities equally, and therefore, ex-post individual rationality requires that for all $v_{1,T}$:

\[
\sum_{t=1}^T u_t(v_t; v_{1,t}; \hat{F}_{1,T}) \geq 0 \quad \text{(ex-post IR)}
\]

For convenience, we will use the phrasing “for $F_{1,T}$” to refer to the environment where the true distributions are $F_{1,T}$. For example, that a mechanism is $\eta(1,T)\text{-DIC}$ for $F_{1,T}$ means that the mechanism is $\eta(1,T)\text{-DIC}$ when the true distributions are $F_{1,T}$.

2.1. Bank Account Mechanism

Even in an environment where the seller has perfect distributional information $\hat{F}_{1,T} = F_{1,T}$, the first challenge in designing a dynamic mechanism is that the descriptive complexity of the mechanism could be exponentially large. In general, the allocation functions and the payment functions depend on the entire sequence of historical bids. We will focus on a simpler, special class of dynamic mechanisms, called bank account mechanisms. For our purposes, this is without loss of generality, because Mirrokni et al. (2018) showed that any dynamic incentive-compatible and ex-post
individual rational mechanism can be converted to a bank account mechanism without loss of revenue.

The salient feature of a bank account mechanism is that it uses a single non-negative real number balₜ, called bank account balance, to summarize the history. Henceforth, the allocation and payment function at stage t only depends on balₜ, bₜ, and the seller’s distributional information.

**Definition 2.2 (Bank Account Mechanism (Mirrokni et al., 2018)).** A bank account mechanism B = ⟨x, p, balU⟩ for F(1, T) is specified by a tuple constituted by x, p, and balU such that for each stage t:

1. A stage mechanism xₜ(bal, bₜ), pₜ(bal, bₜ) is parameterized by a balance bal ∈ ℜ⁺, which is incentive-compatible for the stage for every bal ≥ 0: for any v₁ and b₁,
   \[ v₁ \cdot x₁(bal, v₁) − p₁(bal, v₁) ≥ v₁ \cdot x₁(bal, b₁) − p₁(bal, b₁); \]

   (stage-IC)

2. The mechanism is not necessarily individual rational for the stage. However, the expected utility is balance independent if the buyer reports truthfully:
   \[ \mathbb{E}_{v₁ \sim F_₁}[v₁ \cdot x₁(bal, v₁) − p₁(bal, v₁)] = c₁, \]  
   (BI)

   where c₁ is a constant not dependent on bal;

3. A balance update policy balUₜ : ℜ⁺ × V → ℜ⁺ that maps the previous balance and the buyer’s bid to a new balance, satisfying balUₜ₊₁(balₜ₊₁, bₜ) ≥ 0 and

   \[ \text{balUₜ₊₁(balₜ₊₁, bₜ) ≤ balₜ + bₜ \cdot xₜ(balₜ, bₜ) − pₜ(balₜ, bₜ).} \] 

   (BU)

balₜ₊₁ can be defined recursively as bal₁ = 0 and

\[ \text{balₜ₊₁(bₜ₊₁, t) = balₜ₊₁(balₜ(bₜ₋₁, t), bₜ).} \]

We will use the notation \( xₜ(b₁,t) \) and \( xₜ(bₜ, t) \) where \( \text{bal} = \text{bal}_1(bₜ₋₁, t) \) interchangeably since \( xₜ(b₁,t) \) and \( xₜ(bₜ, t) \) are the same; similarly for \( pₜ \).

Note that (BI) implies that the buyer’s historical reports have no impact on her future expected utilities, assuming she reports truthfully in the future. Therefore, when the seller has perfect distributional information, if the stage mechanism for every stage is stage-IC, a backward induction argument can demonstrate that the mechanism is exactly DIC. Moreover, (BU) ensures that the non-negative balance always lower bounds the buyer’s utility provided truthful reporting. Thus, the bank mechanism is ex-post IR.

### 3. Core Bank Account Mechanism

It is inconvenient to directly analyze the bank account mechanism since we need to relate the stage mechanisms with different bal ≥ 0 to ensure that (BI) is satisfied. A refined characterization called core bank account mechanism (Mirrokni et al., 2016b), provides a more convenient way to ensure (BI). The full proofs of this section are deferred to the full version. After introducing the notion of a core bank account mechanism (Definition 3.1), we develop a novel program to compute the revenue of such a mechanism, even when the seller’s distributional information is imperfect (Section 3.1). We then introduce basic operations for editing core bank account mechanisms (Section 3.2), which enable a unification of core bank account mechanisms (Lemma 3.5) as well as a dynamic program for computing the revenue-optimal mechanism when the seller’s distributional information is perfect (OPT-BAM). The latter will serve as the base mechanism for our robust mechanisms.

**Definition 3.1 (Core Bank Account Mechanism (Mirrokni et al., 2016b)).** A core bank account mechanism \( g(y; F₁,T) \) for \( F₁,T \) is constituted by a family of functions \( g = g₁(T) \) and \( y = y₁(T) \), \( g₁ \) maps a history \( b₁(t) \) to a non-negative real number and \( y₁ \) maps \( b₁(t) \) to the stage allocation. Moreover

1. \( y₁ \) is the sub-gradient of \( g₁ \) with respect to \( b₁; \)

2. \( g₁ \) is consistent, symmetric, convex in \( b₁ \), and weakly increasing in \( b₁ \).

A bank account mechanism \( B(g, y; F₁,T) \) satisfying stage-IC, BI, and BU for \( F₁,T \) can be constructed from a core bank account mechanism \( g(y; \) as follows:

\[ \text{balₜ₊₁(bₜ₊₁, t) = gₜ(bₜ₊₁, t) − } \muₜ(g) \]

\[ xₜ(bₜ₋₁(t), bₜ) = yₜ(bₜ₋₁(t)) \]

\[ \hat{pₜ}(bₜ₋₁(t), bₜ) = yₜ(bₜ₋₁(t)) \cdot bₜ \]

\[ − \int_0^{bₜ} yₜ(bₜ₋₁(t), b) \, db \]

\[ sₜ(bₜ₋₁(t)) = \mathbb{E}_{v₁ \sim F₁}[\int_0^{v₁} yₜ(bₜ₋₁(t), v) \, dv] \]

\[ + \chiₜ(g) − \muₜ(g) + \muₜ(g) \]

\[ pₜ(bₜ₋₁(t), bₜ) = \hat{pₜ}(bₜ₋₁(t)) \]

\[ + sₜ(bₜ₋₁(t)) \]

where \( \muₜ(g) = \inf_{b₁(t), g₁(bₜ₊₁,t)} \).

Intuitively, the function \( g \) maintains the state of the core bank account mechanism, which can be viewed as a variant of the bank account balance from (1). The function \( y \) defines the stage allocation rule \( xₜ \). By the celebrated Myerson’s Lemma (Myerson, 1981), \( \hat{pₜ} \) is the unique payment rule.
derived from $x_t$ such that $\langle x_t, \hat{p}_t \rangle$ constitutes a stage-IC and stage-IR mechanism. A mechanism $\langle x_t, \hat{p}_t \rangle$ is stage-IR if for any balance $\text{bal} \geq 0$, and for any $v_t$, 
\[ x_t(\text{bal}, v_t) \cdot v_t - \hat{p}_t(\text{bal}, v_t) \geq 0 \quad \text{(stage-IR)} \]
We refer to the stage-IC and stage-IR mechanism $\langle x_t, \hat{p}_t \rangle$ as the local-stage mechanism. The payment function $p_t$ is computed as the sum of $\hat{p}_t$ and $s_t$, where $s_t$ only depends on the historical bids $b_{(t-1)}$, and does not depend on $b_t$. The stage mechanism $(x, p)$ can be interpreted as follows:

1. The seller first charges a spend $s_t$ from the buyer before the buyer learns his valuation $v_t$.

2. The seller runs the local-stage mechanism $\langle x_t, \hat{p}_t \rangle$.

Note that $s_t$ is independent of the buyer’s bid $b_t$ at stage $t$, and therefore, the stage mechanism $\langle x_t, p_t \rangle$ is stage-IC.

It is straightforward to verify that the expected utility at stage $t$ is always $-\chi_t(g) + \mu_{t-1}(g) - \mu_t(g)$, independent of $\text{bal}(b_{(t-1)})$.

Moreover, BU is satisfied with equality such that $\text{bal}_{t+1}(b_{(1:t)}) = \text{bal}_t + b_t \cdot x_t(b_{(1:t-1)}) - p_t(b_{(1:t)})$. Since both $g$ and $y$ are symmetric, we abuse the notation slightly and let $g_t(b_{(t-1)}, b_t) = g_t(b_{(1:t)})$ and $y_t(b_{(t-1)}, b_t) = y_t(b_{(1:t)})$.

3.1. Revenue of Core Bank Account Mechanism

Let $\hat{u}_t(\text{bal}(b_{(t-1)}), b_t) = x_t(b_{(1:t-1)}, b_t) \cdot b_t - \hat{p}_t(\text{bal}(b_{(1:t-1)}), b_t)$ be the buyer’s utility from the local-stage mechanism $\langle x_t, \hat{p}_t \rangle$. By taking the equality in BU, we have $\text{bal}_{t+1}(b_{(1:t)}) = \text{bal}_t(b_{(1:t-1)}) + \hat{u}_t(\text{bal}(b_{(1:t-1)}), b_t) - s_t(\text{bal}(b_{(1:t-1)}))$. Plugging in (1) and (4), and noticing that $\int_0^\infty y_t(b_{(1:t-1)}, v) dv = \hat{u}_t(\text{bal}(b_{(1:t-1)}), v_t)$ we have:

\[ g_t(b_{(1:t)}) = g_{t-1}(b_{(t-1)}, + \hat{u}_t(\text{bal}(b_{(1:t-1)}), b_t) - \chi_t(g) - \mathbb{E}_{v_t \sim F_t}[\hat{u}_t(b_{(1:t-1)}, v_t)] \quad (6) \]

Equation (6) is useful because it connects the transition between $g_{t-1}(b_{(t-1)}, b_t)$ and $g_t(b_{(1:t)})$ to the buyer’s utility obtained from the local-stage mechanism at stage $t$. This connection enables a convenient way to compute the revenue of a core bank account mechanism.

**Definition 3.2 (Revenue Tracking Program).** For a core bank account mechanism $\langle g, y \rangle$ for $F_{(1:T)}$, we consider a revenue tracking program $\psi_t(\xi; B(g, y; F_{(1:T)}); F_{(1:T)})$ to compute the revenue of implementing $B(g, y; F_{(1:T)})$ when the buyer’s true distribution is $F_{(1:T)}$. We define $\psi_{t-1}(\xi; B(g, y; F_{(1:T)}); F_{(1:T)})$ to be $-\xi$ when $t = T$ and

\[ \mathbb{E}[y_t(\xi, v_t') \cdot v_t' + \psi_t(g_t(\xi, v_t'); B(g, y; F_{(1:T)}); F_{(1:T)})] \]

when $t < T$, where the expectation is taken over $v_t \sim F_t$ and $v_t'$ is the buyer’s bid that maximizes her continuation utility when her true value is $v_t$.

The revenue tracking program provides a tool to compute the revenue, even when the seller’s distributional information is not perfectly aligned with the true distribution. Let $\text{Rev}(B, F_{(1:T)})$ be the revenue of implementing $B$ when the buyer’s true valuation is $F_{(1:T)}$.

**Lemma 3.3.** $\text{Rev}(B(g, y; \hat{F}_{(1:T)}), F_{(1:T)})$ can be computed as $\psi_0(g_0; B(g, y; \hat{F}_{(1:T)}); F_{(1:T)}) + \mu_T(g)$.

The proof of Lemma 3.3 is based on the fact that the quantity $\psi_0(g_0; B(g, y; \hat{F}_{(1:T)}); F_{(1:T)})$ can be written as

\[ \psi_0(g_0; B(g, y; \hat{F}_{(1:T)}); F_{(1:T)}) = \mathbb{E}_{v_1(1:T)} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T y_t(v_t', v_t) \cdot v_t' \right] - \mathbb{E}_{v_1(1:T)} \left[ g_T(v_T', v_T) \right] \]

(7)

where the expectation is taken over $F_{(1:T)}$. Recall that $y_t(v_t', v_t)$ defines the allocation rule by (2). Therefore, $\mathbb{E}_{v_1(1:T)} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T y_t(v_t', v_t) \cdot v_t' \right]$ is exactly the expected reported welfare, i.e., the welfare computed from the buyer’s reported bids. Moreover, using (6) that connects $g$ and the buyer’s utility, we can show that $g_T(v_T', v_T)$ is equal to the buyer’s reported utility plus $\mu_T(g)$, i.e.,

\[ g_T(v_T', v_T) = \mu_T(g) + \sum_{t=1}^T \left[ x_t(\text{bal}_t(v_t', v_t), b_t) \cdot b_t - p_t(\text{bal}_t(v_t', v_t), v_t') \right] \]

(8)

We can then compute the revenue by taking the difference between reported welfare and reported utility.

3.2. Operations on Core Bank Account Mechanism

Given a core bank account $(g, y)$ for $F_{(1:T)}$, we can apply modifications on $\langle g, y \rangle$ to obtain a new core bank account mechanism $\langle g', y' \rangle$. We introduce three basic operations that we will use to modify a core bank account mechanism.

These operations change the dynamics of the core bank account mechanism, and are useful for us to unify the core bank account mechanism (Lemma 3.5) and make it robust (Definition 4.6).

1. A follow-the-history operation at stage $t$ is defined as

\[ g_t'(b_{(1:t)}) = g_t(b_{(t-1)}) + g_t(b_{(1:t)}) - g_{t-1}(b_{(t-1)}) \]

By (2) and (3), $x_t(b_{(1:t)}) = x_t(b_{(1:t)})$ and $\hat{p}_t(b_{(1:t)}) = \hat{p}_t(b_{(1:t)})$ for any $b_{(1:t)}$. Therefore, $(x_t, \hat{p}_t)$ under $\langle g, y \rangle$ is the same as $(x_t', \hat{p}_t')$ under $\langle g', y' \rangle$ for the same history.

2. A follow-the-state operation at stage $t$ is defined as

\[ g_t(b_{(1:t)}) = g_t(g_{t-1}(b_{(t-1)}), b_t) \]

\[ y_t'(b_{(1:t)}) = y_t(g_{t-1}(b_{(t-1)}), b_t) \]

The buyer tracking program provides a tool to compute the revenue, even when the seller’s distributional information is not perfectly aligned with the true distribution. Let $\text{Rev}(B, F_{(1:T)})$ be the revenue of implementing $B$ when the buyer’s true valuation is $F_{(1:T)}$.
By (2) and (3), for historical bids $b_{1:t-1}(t-1)$ and $b_{1:t-1}'(t-1)$, if $g_{t-1}(b_{1:t-1}) = g_{t-1}'(b_{1:t-1})$, then $x_t(b_{1:t-1}, b_t) = x'_t(b_{1:t-1}, b_t)$ and $p_t(b_{1:t-1}, b_t) = p'_t(b_{1:t-1}, b_t)$. Therefore, for two histories mapped to the same state, $(x_t, p_t)$ under $(g, y)$ is the same as $(x'_t, p'_t)$ under $(g', y')$.

(3) A state-shift operation at stage $t$ is defined as,

$$g'_t(b_{1:t}) = g_t(b_{1:t}) + \delta$$ and $y'_t(b_{1:t}) = y_t(b_{1:t})$,

for some $\delta$. Basically, a state shift operation simply follows $(g, y)$ so that the local-stage mechanism remains the same. However, there is an additional term $\delta$ that is added to the state transition function.

**Remark 3.4.** It is worth noting that, although the local-stage mechanisms are maintained for all the operations, the stage mechanism might not be the same since the payment $p_t$ includes an additional term, the spend $s_t$ that depends on $\chi_t(g')$, $\mu_{t-1}(g')$, and $\mu_t(g')$ according to (5).

### 3.3. Optimal Core Bank Account Mechanism

The next lemma demonstrates that any core bank account mechanism $(g, y)$ can be turned into a core bank account mechanism $(g', y')$ with $\chi_t(g') = 0$ for all $t$ and $\mu_t(g') = 0$ with the same revenue.

**Lemma 3.5.** For a core bank account mechanism $(g, y)$ for $F_{1:T}$, we construct a core bank account mechanism $(g', y')$ with $\chi_t(g') = 0$ for all $t$ and $\mu_t(g') = 0$ that shares the same revenue as $(g, y)$ as follows:

- $g'_0 = g_0 - \sum_t \chi_t(g) - \mu_T(g)$,
- For $t > 0$, $g'_t(b_{1:t}) = g_{t-1}'(b_{1:t-1}) + g_t(b_{1:t}) - g_{t-1}(b_{1:t-1}) + \chi_t(g)$ and $y'_t(b_{1:t}) = y_t(b_{1:t})$.

In this construction, we apply a follow-the-history operation and a state-shift operation with $\delta = \chi_t(g)$ for stage $t > 0$, and shift the initial state down by $\sum_t \chi_t(g) + \mu_T(g)$.

**Utility Interpretation.** Under truthful bidding, the buyer’s utility is $\hat{u}_t(\text{bal}_t(b_{1:t-1}'), v_t) - \hat{s}_t(\text{bal}_t(b_{1:t-1}'))) at stage $t$ and the expected utility is $E_{v_t \sim F_t}[\hat{u}_t(\text{bal}_t(b_{1:t-1}'), v_t)] - \hat{s}_t(\text{bal}_t(b_{1:t-1}')))$. The spend $\hat{s}_t(\text{bal}_t(b_{1:t-1}'))) is cancelled, after taking the difference. When $\chi_t(g) = 0$, the transition function (6) of $g$ at stage $t$ can be interpreted as: first subtract the buyer’s expected utility at stage $t$ and then add the buyer’s realized utility at stage $t$. Therefore, for a core bank account mechanism with $\chi_t(g) = 0$ and $\mu_t(g) = 0$, we can interpret the state $g_t(b_{1:t})$ as the promised utility of the buyer, which is the sum of the realized utility for the first $t$ stages and the expected utility in the future.

**Dynamic Programming.** We are now ready to design a dynamic programming algorithm (Mirrokni et al., 2016b) to compute the revenue-optimal core bank account mechanism. Let $\phi_t-1(\xi; F_{1:T})$ be the optimal revenue for the sub-problem consisting of stages from $t$ to $T$, when the buyer’s true distribution is $F_{1:T}$ and the current state is $\xi \geq 0$. Through backward dynamic programming from stage $T$ to stage 1, we can compute $\phi_{T-1}(\xi; F_{1:T})$ from the following program (OPT-BAM):

$$\max_{\xi, v_t, t} \sum_{t=1}^T \left[ z_t(\xi, v_t) \cdot v_t + \phi_t(h_t(\xi, v_t); F_{1:T}) \right]$$

s.t. $(z_t(\xi, \cdot), \hat{q}_t(\xi, \cdot))$ is a stage-IC and IR mechanism $\forall u_t, \xi + \hat{u}_t(\xi, v_t) - E_{v_t \sim F_t}[\hat{u}_t(\xi, v_t') | v_t'] \geq 0$ (OPT-BAM)

where $\hat{u}_t(\xi, v_t) = v_t \cdot z_t(\xi, v_t) - \hat{q}_t(\xi, v_t)$. In the above program, the free variables are $z_t(\xi, \cdot)$ and $\hat{q}_t(\xi, \cdot)$ while the state transition function $h_t(\xi, v_t) = \xi + \hat{u}_t(\xi, v_t) - E_{v_t \sim F_t}[\hat{u}_t(\xi, v_t') | v_t']$ is determined by $z_t(\xi, v_t)$ and $\hat{q}_t(\xi, v_t)$, and ensures consistency. Henceforth, the task of the program is to find a local-stage mechanism $(z_t(\xi, \cdot), \hat{q}_t(\xi, \cdot))$ that is stage-IC and stage-IR and maximizes the objective.

The optimal initial state is $\xi^*_0 = \arg \max_{\xi_0 \geq 0} \phi_0(\xi_0; F_{1:T})$ and let $B(g_{\xi^*_0}; F_{1:T})$ be the optimal mechanism. A FPTAS can be obtained by approximating $\phi_0(\cdot; F_{1:T})$ by piece-wise linear functions with polynomial-many pieces (Mirrokni et al., 2016b).

### 3.4. Mismatch between $F_{1:T}$ and $\hat{F}_{1:T}$

Before we end this section, we provide the first component of our robust dynamic mechanism that quantifies the revenue loss due to the mismatch in distributional information. The next lemma demonstrates that the gradient of the revenue function in terms of the state is at least $-1$, which enables us to relate the revenue loss to the amount of state shift.

**Lemma 3.6.** For any stage $t$, state $\xi \geq 0$, and $\delta > 0$, $\phi_t(\xi + \delta; \hat{F}_{1:T}) \geq \phi_t(\xi; F_{1:T}) - \delta$.

With Lemma 3.6 at hand, we can show that the revenue of the optimal dynamic mechanism for $\hat{F}_{1:T}$ is close to the revenue of the optimal dynamic mechanism for $F_{1:T}$.

**Lemma 3.7.** Let $\phi_0(\xi^*_0; \hat{F}_{1:T})$ be the revenue of the optimal dynamic mechanism for $\hat{F}_{1:T}$ and let $\phi_0(\xi^*_0; F_{1:T})$ be the revenue of the optimal dynamic mechanism for $F_{1:T}$. Then, $\phi_0(\xi^*_0; \hat{F}_{1:T}) \geq \phi_0(\xi^*_0; F_{1:T}) - O(\Delta \sum_v a_v)$.

### 4. Robust Bank Account Mechanism

In this section we provide the central contribution of this paper: a framework to make the optimal bank account mechanism for $F_{1:T}$ robust against the estimation error and the buyer’s misreport when the true distributions are $F_{1:T}$. We
first show that the magnitude of the misreport can be related to the estimation error and the sequence of \( a(t,T) \). Next, we demonstrate how to design a revenue robust mechanism in which the revenue loss can be related to the magnitude of the misreport and the estimation error. The full proofs of this section are deferred to the full version.

### 4.1. Misreport from the Buyer

Since the seller does not have perfect distributional information, there is no way for the seller to compute the buyer’s expected future utility exactly. As a result, the seller is not able to design a prior-dependent dynamic mechanism achieving exact dynamic incentive-compatibility.

To this end, we modify a core bank account mechanism \((g,y)\) for \( F_t(1,T)\) to obtain a dynamic mechanism that is \( \eta(1,T)\)-DIC for \( F(1,T)\). To begin with, note that for an arbitrary core bank account mechanism \((g,y)\) for \( F_t(1,T)\), the corresponding bank account mechanism \(B(g,y;F_t(1,T))\) is stage-IC and BU for \( F_t(1,T)\). Moreover, both of these properties do not depend on the the buyer’s true distribution in a single buyer environment. Hence, \(B(g,y;F_t(1,T))\) is stage-IC and BU for \( F(1,T)\). Recall that BU ensures ex-post IR, and thus, \(B(g,y;F_t(1,T))\) is also ex-post IR for \( F(1,T)\). However, \(B(g,y;F_t(1,T))\) is no longer BI for \( F(1,T)\). To overcome this difficulty, we generalize the definition of BI.

**Definition 4.1 (Approximate BI).** A bank account mechanism for \( F(1,T)\) is \( \delta(1,T)\)-BI if, for each \( t \) and any \( bal \geq 0 \), there exists a constant \( c_t \) independent of \( bal \) such that

\[
\mathbb{E}_{\epsilon_t \sim F_t}(v_t \cdot x_t(bal, v_t) - p_t(bal, v_t)) \in [c + \Delta_t, c + \Delta_t/2].
\]

Under Assumption 2.1, for the same stage mechanism, the difference between the expected utility under \( F_t \) and \( F \) is at most \( \Delta_t \). As a result, \(B(g,y;F_t(1,T))\) is \( \delta(1,T)\)-BI with \( \delta_t = 2\Delta_t \). Combining these observations, we have the following lemma on \(B(g,y;F_t(1,T))\) for \( F_t(1,T)\):

**Lemma 4.2.** For a core bank account mechanism \((g,y)\) for \( F_t(1,T)\), \(B(g,y;F_t(1,T))\) is stage-IC, \( \delta(1,T)\)-BI with \( \delta_t = 2\Delta_t \), BU and ex-post IR for \( F_t(1,T)\).

For a bank account mechanism satisfying \( \delta(1,T)\)-BI for \( F_t(1,T)\), the range of expected utility is \( \delta_t \) for the \( t \)-th stage. Therefore, no matter how the buyer misreports in the first \((t-1)\) stages, her expected utility in the \( t \)-th stage can only fluctuate by at most \( \delta_t \) under truthful reporting. The fact that the stage mechanisms are stage-IC for \( F(1,T)\) implies that the buyer’s expected utility at a stage is maximized when she reports truthfully. Therefore, we are able to upper bound the continuation utility from a misreport.

**Lemma 4.3.** For a dynamic mechanism that is stage-IC and \( \delta(1,T)\)-BI for \( F_t(1,T)\), for any \( b_{(t-1)} \) and \( v_t \), the difference between the continuation utility of reporting any \( b_t \in [0, a_t] \) and the continuation utility of reporting \( v_t \) truthfully is bounded by \( \sum_{t'=t+1}^{T} \gamma^{t'-t} \cdot \delta_t \).

As a result, once the dynamic mechanism posts a risk for the buyer to misreport at stage \( t \), we are able to bound the magnitude of the buyer’s misreport. To do so, we mix the dynamic mechanism with a random posted-price auction at every stage, with probability \( \lambda \).

**Definition 4.4 (\( \eta(1,T)\)-DIC Mechanism).** Given a bank account mechanism \( B = (x,p, balU)\) satisfying stage-IC, \( \delta(1,T)\)-BI and BU for \( F(1,T)\), we construct a bank account mechanism \( \bar{B} = (\bar{x}, \bar{p}, \bar{balU})\) by mixing \( B(x,p; F_t(1,T))\) with a random posted price mechanism with probability \( \lambda \). In particular, the random posted price mechanism at stage \( t \) posts a price uniformly from \( [0,a_t] \):

1. \( \bar{x}(bal,b_t) = (1 - \lambda) \cdot x(bal,b_t) + \lambda \cdot \frac{b_t}{a_t} \).
2. \( \bar{p}(bal,b_t) = (1 - \lambda) \cdot p(bal,b_t) + \lambda \cdot \frac{b_t}{a_t} \).
3. \( \bar{balU}(bal,b_t) = (1 - \lambda) \cdot balU(bal,b_t) \).

Note that a random posted price auction is stage-IC and stage-IR. Moreover, in a random posted price mechanism with a price uniformly drawn from \( [0,a_t] \) at stage \( t \), it can be shown that a misreport with magnitude \( m_t \) will cause the buyer a utility loss \( \frac{m_t^2}{2a_t} \). Since the buyer is a utility-maximizer with discounting factor \( \gamma \), we have the following lemma on the magnitude of misreport for each stage.

**Lemma 4.5.** For \( \bar{B} = (\bar{x}, \bar{p}, \bar{balU})\) constructed according to Definition 4.4 from a \( \delta(1,T)\)-BI mechanism, the mechanism \( \bar{B} \) is stage-IC, \( \delta(1,T)\)-BI and BU for \( F(1,T)\). Moreover, the mechanism is \( \eta(1,T)\)-DIC with \( \eta_t = \sqrt{\frac{2a_t}{\lambda}} \cdot \sum_{t'=t+1}^{T} \gamma^{t'-t} \cdot \delta_t \) and ex-post IR for \( F(1,T)\).

### 4.2. Revenue Robust Mechanism

Given the construction in Definition 4.4 and Lemma 4.5, any bank account mechanism \( B \) for \( F_t(1,T)\) can be turned into a \( \eta(1,T)\)-DIC mechanism \( \bar{B} \) for \( F_t(1,T)\) by mixing \( B \) with a random posted price auction for each stage with probability \( \lambda \). Excluding the random posted price auction, the remaining mechanism is in fact \( B \) with probability \( (1-\lambda) \) such that for stage \( t \), the misreport of the buyer is at most \( \eta_t \). Given \( \eta(1,T) \), we construct a revenue robust mechanism in which the revenue is robust against the buyer’s misreport.

**Definition 4.6 (Revenue Robust Mechanism).** For a core bank account mechanism \((g,y)\) for \( F_t(1,T)\), assuming the magnitude of the misreport at stage \( t \) is at most \( \eta_t \), we construct a revenue robust core bank account mechanism \((\bar{g}, \bar{y})\) with \( \bar{\eta}_t = \Delta_a \) for all \( t \) such that \( \bar{y}_t = y_0 \) and

\[
\bar{g}_t(b_{(t-1)}) = g_t(\bar{g}_{t-1}(b_{(t-1)}), b_t) + \beta_t + \eta_t
\]

\[
\bar{y}_t(b_{(t-1)}) = y_t(\bar{y}_{t-1}(b_{(t-1)}), b_t)
\]
We are ready to construct our robust bank account mechanism. Under Assumption 2.1, (Lemma 3.7 and Lemma 4.7, we have:

\[ \text{Revenue loss} \leq \sum_t (\Delta a_t + \eta_t). \]

In particular, the condition in Lemma 4.7 is satisfied by the revenue-optimal mechanism by Lemma 3.6.

4.3. Final Mechanism

We are ready to construct our robust bank account mechanism. We first compute the optimal bank account mechanism \( B(g, \hat{y}; \hat{F}(1, T)) \) for the estimated distributional information \( \hat{F}(1, T) \) (Section 3.3). We then compute the revenue robust mechanism \( \langle g, \hat{y} \rangle \) from \( \langle g, y \rangle \) (Definition 4.6), and finally, mix in a random posted price mechanism to obtain \( \tilde{B}(g, \hat{y}; \hat{F}(1, T)) \) (Definition 4.4).

**Theorem 4.8.** Under Assumption 2.1, \( \tilde{B}(g, \hat{y}; \hat{F}(1, T)) \) is stage-IC, BU and ex-post IR for \( F(1, T) \).

The mechanism is \( \hat{\theta}(1, T), B \)-IL with \( \hat{\theta}(1, T) = 2\Delta a_t \) and \( \eta(1, T) - DIC \) and \( \eta_t = \sqrt{2\beta_t \Delta_t} \cdot \sum_{t'=t+1}^{T} a_{t'} \) for \( F(1, T) \).

In the worst case, the revenue loss from the random posted price auction is at most the expected welfare \( \lambda \sum_t \mathbb{E}_{v_t \sim F_t} |v_t| \leq \lambda \sum_t a_t = \lambda T \). Moreover, we can establish an upper bound on the total magnitude of the buyer’s misreport \( \sum_t \eta_t = O(\sqrt{\Delta/\lambda} \cdot T) \). Finally, combining Lemma 3.7, and Lemma 4.7, we have:

**Theorem 4.9.**

\[
\text{Revenue} \big( \tilde{B}(g, \hat{y}; \hat{F}(1, T)), F(1, T) \big) \\
\geq \text{Revenue} \left( B^*(F(1, T)), F(1, T) \right) - O(\lambda T + \sqrt{\Delta/\lambda} \cdot T)
\]

where \( B^*(F(1, T)) \) is the optimal clairvoyant mechanism for \( F(1, T) \), where \( \Delta \) is the bias bound in Assumption 2.1. The revenue loss is minimized when \( \lambda = \Delta^2 \), which results in revenue loss \( O(\Delta^2 T) \).

5. No-Regret Policy in Contextual Auctions

In this section, we apply our robust dynamic mechanism in a learning environment, leading to policies that achieve low regret against the optimal clairvoyant mechanism (which has full and accurate distributional information) in the domain of contextual auctions.

5.1. Contextual Auctions

In a contextual auction, the item at stage \( t \) is represented by an observable feature vector \( \zeta_t \in \mathbb{R}^d \) with \( \|\zeta_t\|_2 \leq 1 \). In line with the literature, we assume that the feature vectors are drawn independently from a fixed distribution \( D \) with positive-definite covariance matrix (Golrezaei et al., 2019). The buyer’s preferences are encoded by a fixed vector \( \sigma \in \mathbb{R}^d \) and the buyer’s valuation at stage \( t \) takes the form \( v_t = a_t((\sigma, \zeta_t) + n_t) \), where \( n_t \) is a noise term with cumulative distribution \( M_t \). The distribution \( M_t \) and the feature vector \( \zeta_t \) are known to the buyer in advance, but the buyer’s preference vector \( \sigma \) remains private. In line with the literature (Deng et al., 2019a), we make the following technical assumption that upper bounds the sequence of domain bounds \( a_t \):

**Assumption 5.1** (Deng et al. (2019a)). For all stages \( t \), we assume that \( \sum_{t' \leq t} a_{t'} \leq c_a \cdot t \) where \( c_a \) is a constant.

Assumption 5.1 limits the portion of welfare and revenue that can arise in the first \( t \) stages, for any \( t \). Its purpose is to rule out situations where a large fraction of revenue comes from the initial stages, under which a large revenue loss may be inevitable since it is impossible for the seller to obtain a good estimate of \( \sigma \) from just the first few stages.

Our task is to design a policy \( \pi \) that includes both a learning policy for \( \sigma \) and an associated dynamic mechanism policy to extract revenue. At the beginning of stage \( t \), the learning policy estimates \( \hat{F}_t \) using information \( (a_t, \zeta_t, M_t) \), and \( b_{(1,t-1)} \) while the dynamic mechanism policy computes the stage mechanism \( \langle x_t, p_t \rangle \) at stage \( t \). Let \( \text{Rev}(\pi, F(1, T)) \) and \( \text{Rev}(B; F(1, T)) \) be the revenue of implementing policy \( \pi \) and mechanism \( B \) for \( F(1, T) \), respectively. Moreover, let \( B^*(F(1, T)) \) denote the revenue-optimal clairvoyant dynamic mechanism that knows \( F(1, T) \) in advance. The regret of policy \( \pi \) against the dynamic benchmark is defined as \( \text{Regret}(\pi) = \text{Rev}(B^*(F(1, T)), F(1, T)) - \text{Rev}(\pi; F(1, T)). \) Our objective is to design a policy with sublinear regret for both the clairvoyant and the semi-clairvoyant environments.

5.2. Clairvoyant Environment

Due to space limitations, the details of our no-regret policies are deferred to the full version. Our robust dynamic mechanism enables a no-regret policy in the clairvoyant environment.
Theorem 5.2. There exists a policy such that the $T$-stage regret of the contextual auction in a clairvoyant environment is $O(T^{\frac{4}{3}})$ against the optimal clairvoyant dynamic mechanism that knows the buyer’s preference vector in advance.

5.3. Semi-clairvoyant Environment

We can generalize our results to a semi-clairvoyant environment. In a semi-clairvoyant environment, the seller does not know the time horizon $T$ and he obtains the estimated distributions in $W > 1$ batches, specified by $(\tau_1 = 1, \tau_2, \ldots, \tau_W, \tau_{W+1} = T + 1)$. The $j$-th batch contains the estimated distributions for items arriving between stage $\tau_j$ and stage $(\tau_{j+1} - 1)$. In other words, letting $B_j$ be the set of stages in batch $j$, the seller obtains the estimated distributions for batch $j$ at the beginning of stage $\tau_j$ and not before, so that the mechanism at stage $t \in B_j$ can only depend on $\hat{F}_{(1, \tau_{j+1} - 1)}$. Henceforth, in the contextual auction, the seller can learn the information about stage $t \in B_j$ (i.e., $a_t, \zeta_t$, and $M_t$) at the beginning of stage $\tau_j$.

However, in the worst-case scenario, a semi-clairvoyant environment will degenerate to a non-clairvoyant environment in which each batch only contains one stage, and Mirrokni et al. (2018) demonstrate that the approximation ratio between the optimal non-clairvoyant mechanism and the optimal clairvoyant mechanism is at most $\frac{1}{2}$. To circumvent this impossibility and obtain a no-regret policy against the optimal clairvoyant mechanism, we introduce a measure to capture the revenue gap between the semi-clairvoyant and the clairvoyant mechanism:

Definition 5.3. Given $B_{(1,W)}$ and $a_{(1,T)}$, we define a measure $\mathcal{V}(B_{(1,W)}, a_{(1,T)}) = \sum_{j=1}^{W} \sqrt{\sum_{t \in B_j} a_t^2}$.

The regret of our policy in the semi-clairvoyant environment depends on $\mathcal{V}(B_{(1,W)}, a_{(1,T)})$, and the regret is sublinear when $\mathcal{V}(B_{(1,W)}, a_{(1,T)}) = o(T)$. Observe that, $\sum_{j=1}^{W} \sqrt{\sum_{t \in B_j} a_t^2} \leq \sum_{j=1}^{W} \sum_{t \in B_j} a_t = T$. Therefore, the difference between $\mathcal{V}(B_{(1,W)}, a_{(1,T)})$ and $T$ is captured by the sum of the difference between $\sqrt{\sum_{t \in B_j} a_t^2}$ and $\sum_{t \in B_j} a_t$. Such a difference is small for batch $j$ when there exists a stage $t' \in B_j$ such that $a_{t'}$ is close to $\sum_{t \in B_j} a_t$, which implies that there is no much difference between focusing on stage $t'$ only and the stages in batch $B_j$, since the revenue contribution from stages other than $t'$ from $B_j$ is relatively small. Therefore, when the difference between $\sqrt{\sum_{t \in B_j} a_t^2}$ and $\sum_{t \in B_j} a_t$ is small, a semi-clairvoyant environment degenerates to a non-clairvoyant environment.

We obtain a no-regret policy by combining our robust dynamic mechanism with a carefully designed learning policy.

Theorem 5.4. There exists a policy such that the $T$-stage regret of the contextual auction in a semi-clairvoyant environment is $\tilde{O}(T^{\frac{5}{4}} + \mathcal{V}(B_{(1,W)}, a_{(1,T)}))$ against the optimal clairvoyant dynamic mechanism that knows the buyer’s preference vector in advance. In particular, the regret is sublinear when $\mathcal{V}(B_{(1,W)}, a_{(1,T)}) = o(T)$.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we provided a new framework for designing dynamic mechanisms that are robust to estimation errors in value distributions as well as to strategic behavior. We applied the framework to design policies for contextual auctions that are no-regret against the revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism that has full information about the buyer’s distributions, in both the clairvoyant environment and the semi-clairvoyant environment.

A natural direction to consider in the future is to improve the revenue loss bound of our robust dynamic mechanism as well as our no-regret policies. Is it possible to design a robust dynamic mechanism or no-regret policy with smaller revenue loss? Or could we provide a lower bound for the loss? It would also be interesting to apply our framework to contextual auctions with other kinds of valuation structures, and other dynamic auction environments more generally.

References


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