CRFL: Certifiably Robust Federated Learning against Backdoor Attacks

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Abstract
Federated Learning (FL) as a distributed learning paradigm that aggregates information from diverse clients to train a shared global model, has demonstrated great success. However, malicious clients can perform poisoning attacks and model replacement to introduce backdoors into the trained global model. Although there have been intensive studies designing robust aggregation methods and empirical robust federated training protocols against backdoors, existing approaches lack robustness certification. This paper provides the first general framework, Certifiably Robust Federated Learning (CRFL), to train certifiably robust FL models against backdoors. Our method exploits clipping and smoothing on model parameters to control the global model smoothness, which yields a sample-wise robustness certification on backdoors with limited magnitude. Our certification also specifies the relation to federated learning parameters, such as poisoning ratio on instance level, number of attackers, and training iterations. Practically, we conduct comprehensive experiments across a range of federated datasets, and provide the first benchmark for certified robustness against backdoor attacks in federated learning. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/AI-secure/CRFL.

1. Introduction
Federated learning (FL) has been widely applied to different applications given its high efficiency and privacy-preserving properties (Smith et al., 2017; McMahan et al., 2017a; Zhao et al., 2018). However, recent studies show that it is easy for the local client to add adversarial perturbation such as “backdoors” during training to compromise the final aggregated model (Bhagoji et al., 2019; Bagdasaryan et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020; Xie et al., 2019). Such attacks raise great security concerns and have become the roadblocks towards the real-world deployment of federated learning.

Although there have been intensive studies on robust FL by designing robust aggregation methods (Fung et al., 2020; Pillutla et al., 2019; Fu et al., 2019; Blanchard et al., 2017; El Mhamdi et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2018), developing empirically robust federated training protocols (e.g., gradient clipping (Sun et al., 2019), leveraging noisy perturbation (Sun et al., 2019) and additional evaluation during training (Andreina et al., 2020)), current defense approaches lack robustness guarantees against the backdoor attacks under certain conditions. To the best of our knowledge, certified robustness analysis and algorithms for FL against backdoor attacks remain elusive.

To bridge this gap, in this work we propose a certifiably robust federated learning (CRFL) framework as illustrated in Figure 1. In particular, during training, we allow the local agent to update their model parameters to the center server, and the server will: 1) aggregate the collected model updates, 2) clip the norm of the aggregated model parameters, 3) add a random noise to the clipped model, and finally 4) send the new model parameters back to each agent. Note that all of the operations are conducted on the server side to reduce the load for local clients and to prevent malicious clients. During testing, the server will smooth the final global model with randomized parameter smoothing and make the final prediction based on the parameter-smoothed model.

Figure 1. Overview of certifiably robust federated learning (CRFL)
Using CRFL, we theoretically prove that the trained global model would be certifiably robust against backdoors as long as the backdoor is within our certified bound. To obtain such robustness certification, we first quantify the closeness of models aggregated in each step by viewing this process as a Markov Kernel (Asoodeh & Calmon, 2020; Makur, 2019; Polyanskiy & Wu, 2015; 2017). We then leverage the model closeness together with the parameter smoothing procedure to certify the final prediction. Empirically, we conduct extensive evaluations on MNIST, EMNIST, and financial datasets to evaluate the certified robustness of CRFL and study how FL parameters affect certified robustness.

Technical Contributions. In this paper, we take the first step towards providing certified robustness for FL against backdoor attacks. We make contributions on both theoretical and empirical fronts.

- We propose the first certifiably robust federated learning (CRFL) framework against backdoor attacks.
- Theoretically, we analyze the training dynamics of the aggregated model via Markov Kernel, and propose parameter smoothing for model inference. Altogether, we prove the certified robustness of CRFL.
- We conduct extensive experiments on MNIST, EMNIST, and financial datasets to show the effect of different FL parameters (e.g. poisoning ratio, number of attackers, and training iterations) on certified robustness.

2. Related work

Backdoor Attacks on Federated Learning. The goal of backdoor attacks against federated learning is to train strong poisoned local models and submit malicious model updates to the central server, so as to mislead the global model (Bhagoji et al., 2019). (Bagdasaryan et al., 2020) studies the model replacement approach, where the attacker scales malicious model updates to replace the global model with local backdoored one. (Xie et al., 2019) exploit the decentralized nature of federated learning and propose a distributed backdoor attack.

Robust Federated Learning. In order to nullify the effects of attacks while aggregating client updates, a number of robust aggregation algorithms have been proposed for distributed learning (Fung et al., 2020; Pillutla et al., 2019; Fu et al., 2019; Blanchard et al., 2017; El Mhamdi et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2018). These methods either identify and down-weight the malicious updates through certain distance or similarity metrics, or estimate a true “center” of the received model updates rather than taking a weighted average. However, many of those methods assume that the data distribution is i.i.d cross distributed clients, which is not the case in FL setting. Other defenses are several robust federated protocols that mitigate poisoning attacks during training. (Andreina et al., 2020) incorporates an additional validation phase to each round of FL to detect backdoor. (Sun et al., 2019) show that clipping the norm of model updates and adding Gaussian noise can mitigate backdoor attacks that are based on the model replacement paradigm. None of these provides certified robustness guarantees.

A concurrent work (Cao et al., 2021) proposes Ensemble FL for provable secure FL against malicious clients, which requires training hundreds of FL models and focuses on client-level certification. Our work allows standard FL protocol, and our certification is applicable to feature, sample, and client levels.

3. Preliminaries

3.1. Federated Averaging

Learning Objective. Suppose the model parameters are denoted by $w \in \mathbb{R}^d$, we consider the following distributed optimization problem: $\min_{w \in \mathbb{R}^d} \{ F(w) \triangleq \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i F_i(w) \}$, where $N$ is the number of clients, and $p_i$ is the aggregation weight of the $i$-th client such that $p_i \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i = 1$. Suppose the $i$-th client holds $n_i$ training data in its local dataset $S_i = \{ z_{i,1}, z_{i,2}, \ldots, z_{i,n_i} \}$. The local objective $F_i(\cdot)$ is defined by $F_i(w) \triangleq \frac{1}{n_i} \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \ell(w; z_{i,j})$, where $\ell(\cdot; \cdot)$ is a defined learning loss function.

One Round of Federated Learning (Periodic Averaging SGD). In federated learning, the clients are able to perform multiple local iterations to update the local models (McMahan et al., 2017b). So we formulate the SGD problem in FL as Periodic Averaging SGD (Wang & Joshi, 2019; Li et al., 2020). Specifically, at round $t$, first, the central server sends current global model $w_{t-1}$ to all clients. Second, every client $i$ initializes its local model $w_{i,(t-1)} = w_{t-1}$ and then performs $t_i$ ($t_i \geq 1$) local updates, such that $w_{i,t} \leftarrow w_{i,t-1} - \eta_i g_i(w_{i,t-1}; \xi_i^{(t-1)})$, $s = (t-1)t_i + 1, (t-1)t_i + 2, \ldots, tt_i$, where $\eta_i$ is the learning rate, $\xi_i \subset S_i$ are randomly sampled mini-batches with batch size $n_B$, and $g_i(w; \xi_i) = \frac{1}{n_B} \sum_{j \in \xi_i} \nabla \ell(w; z_j^i)$ denotes the stochastic gradient. The local clients send the local model updates $w_{i,t} - w_{i,t-1}$ to the server. Finally, the server aggregates over the local model updates into the new global model $w_t$ such that $w_t \leftarrow w_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i (w_{i,t} - w_{i,t-1})$.

3.2. Threat Model

The goal of backdoor is to inject a backdoor pattern during training such that any test input with such pattern will be misclassified as the target label (Gu et al., 2019). The purpose of backdoor attacks in FL is to manipulate local models and simultaneously fit the main task and backdoor task, so that the global model would behave normally on untampered data samples while achieving high attack success rate on
backdoored data samples. We consider the backdoor attack via model replacement approach (Bagdasaryan et al., 2020) where the attackers train the local models using the poisoned datasets, and scale the malicious updates before sending it to the server. Suppose there are \( R \) adversarial clients out of \( N \) clients, we assume that each of them only attack once and they perform model replacement attack together at the same round \( t_{adv} \). Such distributed yet coordinated backdoor attack is shown to be effective in (Xie et al., 2019).

Let \( D := \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_N\} \) be the union of original benign local datasets in all clients. For a data sample \( z_j^i \in S_i \), we denote its backdoored version as \( z_i^{\prime j} := \{x_j^i, y_j^i + \delta_i y_j\} \), and the backdoor as \( \delta_i := \{\delta_i x, \delta_i y\} \). We assume an adversarial client \( i \) has \( q_i \) backdoored samples in its local dataset \( S_i^\prime \) with size \( n_i \). Let \( D' := \{S'_1, \ldots, S'_{R-1}, S'_R, S_{R+1}, \ldots, S_N\} \) be the union of local datasets in the adversarial round \( t_{adv} \). Then we have \( D' = D + \{\delta_i z_j^i\}_{j=1}^R \).

Before \( t_{adv} \), the adversarial clients train the local model using original benign datasets. When \( t = t_{adv} \), for adversarial client \( i \), each local iteration is trained on the backdoored local dataset \( S'_i \) such that \( w_s^i \leftarrow w_{s-1}^i - \eta_i g_i(w_{s-1}^i; \xi_{s-1}^i) \), \( s = (t-1)\tau_i + 1, (t-1)\tau_i + 2, \ldots, t\tau_i \), where \( w' \) is the malicious model parameters, \( \xi_{s}^i \) is the mini-batch sampled from \( S_i^\prime \) and the local model is initialized as \( w_{t-1}^i = w_{s-1}^i \). Following (Bagdasaryan et al., 2020), we assume the attacker add a fixed number of backdoored samples \( q_{B_i} \) in each training batch, then the mini-batch gradient is \( g_i(w'; \xi_s^i) = \frac{1}{n_{B_i}} \sum_{j=1}^{n_{B_i}} \nabla \ell(w'; z_j^i) + \frac{1}{n_1} \sum_{j=n_{B_i}+1}^{n_1} \nabla \ell(w'; z_j^i) \). The poison ratio of dataset \( S_i^\prime \) is \( q_{B_i}/n_{B_i} = q_i/n_i \). Since for each local iteration, the local model is updated with backdoored mini-batch samples, more local iterations will drive the local model \( w_s^i \) farther from the corresponding one \( w_s \) in benign training process. Then the adversarial clients scale their malicious local updates before submitting to the server. Let the scale factor be \( \gamma_i \) for \( i \)-th adversarial client, then the scaled update is \( \gamma_i(w_{s+\tau_i}^i - w_{s-1}^i) \). The server aggregates over the malicious and benign updates into an infected global model \( w_t^i \) such that \( w_t^i \leftarrow w_{t-1}^i + \sum_{i=1}^{R} p_i \gamma_i(w_{t-1}^i - w_{t-1}^i) + \sum_{i=R+1}^{N} p_i(w_{t-1}^i - w_{t-1}^i) \). In fact, even though the adversarial clients only attack at round \( t_{adv} \) and in the later rounds \((t > t_{adv})\) they use the original benign datasets, the global model is already infected starting from \( t_{adv} \), so we still denote the global model parameters as \( w_t^i \) in later rounds.

### 4. Methodology

In this Section, we introduce our proposed framework CRFL, which is composed of a training-time subroutine (Algorithm 1) and a test-time subroutine (Algorithm 2) for achieving certified robustness.

4.1. CRFL Training: Clipping and Perturbing

During training, at round \( t = 1, \ldots, T - 1 \), local clients update their models, and the server performs aggregation. Then, in our training protocol, the server clip the model parameters \( \text{Clip}_{\rho_i}(w_t^i) \leftarrow w_t^i / \max(1, \|w_t^i\|_{\rho_i}) \) so that its norm is bounded by \( \rho_i \), and then add isotropic Gaussian noise \( \epsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2 I) \) directly on the aggregated global model parameters (coordinate-wise noise): \( \tilde{w}_t^i \leftarrow \text{Clip}_{\rho_i}(w_t^i) + \epsilon_i \). Throughout this paper, \( \| \cdot \| \) denotes the \( \ell_2 \) norm \( \| \cdot \|_2 \). In the next round \( t + 1 \), client \( i \) initializes its local model with noisy new global model \( w_{t+1}^i \leftarrow \tilde{w}_t^i \). In the final round \( T \), we only clip the global model parameters.

The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1 and denoted by \( \mathcal{M} \), which outputs the global model parameters \( \text{Clip}_{\rho_T}(w_T) \). Then we define \( \mathcal{M}(D) := \text{Clip}_{\rho_T}(w_T) \).

**Algorithm 1** Federated averaging with parameters clipping and perturbing

Server’s input: initial model parameters \( w_0, \tilde{w}_0 \leftarrow \tilde{w}_0 \)

Client \( i \)’s input: local dataset \( S_i \) and learning rate \( \eta_i \)

for each round \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) do

The server sends \( \tilde{w}_{t-1} \) to the \( t \)-th client

for client \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, N \) in parallel do

initialize local model \( w_{(t-1)i}^i \leftarrow \tilde{w}_{t-1} \)

for local iteration \( s = (t-1)\tau_i + 1, \ldots, t\tau_i \) do

compute mini-batch gradient \( g_i(:, s) \)

end for

end for

The \( i \)-th client sends \( w_{t\tau_i}^i - \tilde{w}_{t-1} \) to the server

for \( t \leq T - 1 \) then

\( \epsilon_t \leftarrow \text{a sample drawn from } N(0, \sigma_t^2 I) \)

\( \tilde{w}_t \leftarrow \text{Clip}_{\rho_T}(w_t^i) + \epsilon_t \)

end if

end for

Output: Clipped global model parameters \( \text{Clip}_{\rho_T}(w_T) \)

4.2. CRFL Testing: Parameter Smoothing

Smoothed Classifiers We study multi-class classification models and define a classifier \( h : (\mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y} \) with finite set of label \( \mathcal{Y} = \{1, \ldots, C\} \), where \( C \) denotes the number of classes. We extend the randomized smoothing method (Cohen et al., 2019) to parameter smoothing for constructing a new, “smoothed” classifier \( \tilde{h} \) from an arbitrary base classifier \( h \). The robustness properties can be verified using the smoothed classifier \( \tilde{h}_s \). Given the model parameter \( w \) of \( h \), when queried at a test sample \( x_{test} \), we first take a majority vote over the predictions of the base classifier \( h \) on random model parameters drawn from a prob-
ability distribution $\mu$, i.e., the smoothing measure, to obtain the “votes” $H^s_x(w; x_{\text{test}})$ for each class $c \in \mathcal{Y}$. Then the label returned by the smoothed classifier $h_s$ is the mostly probable label among all classes (the majority vote winner). Formally,

$$h_s(w; x_{\text{test}}) = \arg \max_{c \in \mathcal{Y}} H^s_x(w; x_{\text{test}}) ,$$

where $H^s_x(w; x_{\text{test}}) = \mathbb{P}_{W \sim \mu(w)}[h(W; x_{\text{test}}) = c]$.

(1)

To be aligned with the training time Gaussian noise (perturbation), we also adopt Gaussian smoothing measures $\mu(w) = \mathcal{N}(w, \sigma_T^2 \mathbb{I})$ during testing time. In practice, the exact value of the probability $p_c = \mathbb{P}_{W \sim \mu(w)}[h(W; x_{\text{test}}) = c]$ for label $c$ is difficult to obtain for neural networks, and hence we resort to Monte Carlo estimation (Cohen et al., 2019; Lecuyer et al., 2019) to get its approximation $\hat{p}_c$. At round $t = T$, given the clipped aggregated global model $\text{Clip}_{\ell_T}(w_T)$, we add Gaussian noise $\epsilon^k_T \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2_T \mathbb{I})$ for $M$ times to get $M$ sets of noisy model parameters ($M$ Monte Carlo samples for estimation), such that $\tilde{w}^k_T \leftarrow \text{Clip}_{\ell_T}(w_T) + \epsilon^k_T$, $k = 1, 2, \ldots, M$.

In Algorithm 2, the function GetCounts runs the classifier with each set of noisy model parameters $\tilde{w}^k_T$ for one test sample $x_{\text{test}}$, and returns a vector of class counts. Then we take the most probable class $\hat{c}_A$ and the runner-up class $\hat{c}_B$ to calculate the corresponding $\hat{p}_A$ and $\hat{p}_B$. The function CalculateBound calibrates the empirical estimation to bound the probability $\alpha$ of $h_s$, returning an incorrect label. Given the error tolerance $\alpha$, we use Hoeffding’s inequality (Hoeffding, 1994) to compute a lower bound $p_A$ on the probability $H^A_x(w; x_{\text{test}})$ and a upper bound $\overline{p}_B$ on the probability $H^B_x(w; x_{\text{test}})$ according to $p_A = \hat{p}_A - \sqrt{\frac{\log(1/\alpha)}{2N}}, \overline{p}_B = \hat{p}_B + \sqrt{\frac{\log(1/\alpha)}{2N}}$. We leave the function CalculateRadius to be defined with our main results in later sections and we will analyze the robustness properties of the model trained and tested under our framework CRFL.

Comparison with Certifiably Robust Models in Centralized Setting Our method is different from previous certifiably robust models in centralized learning against evasion attacks (Cohen et al., 2019) and backdoors (Weber et al., 2020). Once the $M$ noisy models (at round $T$, with $\sigma_T$) are generated, they are fixed and used for every test sample during test time, just like RAB (Weber et al., 2020) in the centralized setting. However, RAB actually trains $M$ models using $M$ noise-corrupted datasets, while we just train one model through FL and finally generated $M$ noise-corrupted copies of it. For every test sample, randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019) generates $M$ noisy samples. Suppose the test set size is $m$. Then during testing, there are $m \cdot M$ times noise addition on test samples for randomized smoothing, and $M$ times noises addition on trained model for CRFL. To our best knowledge, this is the first work to study parameter smoothing rather than input smoothing, which is an open problem motivated by the FL scenario, since the sever directly aggregates over the model parameters.

5. Certified Robustness of CRFL

5.1. Pointwise Certified Robustness

Goal of Certification In the context of data poisoning in federated learning, the goal is to protect the global model against adversarial data modification made to the local training sets of distributed clients. Thus, the goal of certifiable robustness in federated learning is for each test point, to return a prediction as well as a certificate that the prediction would not change had some features in (part of) local training data of certain clients been modified.

Following our threat model in Section 3.2 and our training protocol in Algorithm 1, we define the trained global model $\mathcal{M}(D') := \text{Clip}_{\ell_T}(w'_T)$. For the FL training process that is exposed to model replacement attack, when the distance between $D'$ (backdoored dataset) and $D$ (clean dataset) is under certain threshold (i.e., the magnitude of $\{\delta_i\}_{i=1}^R$ is bounded), we can certify that $\mathcal{M}(D')$ is “close” to $\mathcal{M}(D)$ and thus is robust to backdoors. The rationale lies in the fact that we perform clipping and noise perturbation on the model parameters to control the global model deviation during training. During testing, intuitively, under the Gaussian smoothing measures $\mu$ as described in Algorithm 2, for two close distribution $\mu(\mathcal{M}(D'))$ and $\mu(\mathcal{M}(D))$, we would expect that even though the probabilities for each class $c$, i.e., $H^s_x(\mathcal{M}(D'); x_{\text{test}})$ and $H^s_x(\mathcal{M}(D); x_{\text{test}})$, may not be equal, the returned most likely label $h_s(\mathcal{M}(D'); x_{\text{test}})$ and $h_s(\mathcal{M}(D); x_{\text{test}})$ should be consistent.
In summary, we aim to develop a robustness certificate by studying under what condition for \( \{ \{ \delta_i \}_{j=1}^{g_j} \}_{i=1}^{K} \) that the prediction for a test sample is consistent between the smoothed FL models trained from \( D \) and \( D' \) separately, i.e., \( h_s(\mathcal{M}(D'); x_{test}) = h_s(\mathcal{M}(D); x_{test}) \). To put forth our certified robustness analysis, we make the following assumptions on the loss function of all clients. Then we present our main theorem and explain its derivation through model closeness and parameter smoothing. Throughout this paper, we denote \( \nabla_w \ell(w; z) \) as \( \nabla \ell(w; z) \) for simplicity.

**Assumption 1** (Convexity and Smoothness). The loss function \( \ell(w; z) \) is \( \beta \)-smoothness, i.e., \( \forall w_1, w_2, \)

\[
\| \nabla \ell(w_1; z) - \nabla \ell(w_2; z) \| \leq \beta \| w_1 - w_2 \|.
\]

In addition, the loss function \( \ell(w; z) \) is convex. Then coercivity of the gradient states:

\[
\| \nabla \ell(w_1; z) - \nabla \ell(w_2; z) \| ^2 \\
\leq \beta \| w_1 - w_2 \|, \nabla \ell(w_1; z) - \nabla \ell(w_2; z).
\]

**Assumption 2** (Lipschitz Gradient w.r.t. Data). The gradient \( \nabla_w \ell(z; w) \) is \( L_Z \) Lipschitz with respect to the argument \( z \) and norm distance \( \| \cdot \| \), i.e., \( \forall z_1, z_2, \)

\[
\| \nabla \ell(w; z_1) - \nabla \ell(w; z_2) \| \leq L_Z \| z_1 - z_2 \|.
\]

**Assumption 3**. The whole FL system follows Algorithm 1 to train and Algorithm 2 to test.

The assumptions on convexity and smoothness are common in the analysis of distributed SGD (Li et al., 2020; Wang & Joshi, 2019). We also make assumption on the Lipschitz gradient w.r.t. data, which is used in (Fullah et al., 2020; Reisizadeh et al., 2020) for analyzing the heterogeneous data distribution across clients.

**Main Results**

**Theorem 1** (General Robustness Condition). Let \( h_s \) be defined as in Eq. 1. When \( \eta_i \leq \frac{1}{L} \) and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, suppose \( c_A \in \mathcal{Y} \) and \( p_A, p_B \in [0, 1] \) satisfy

\[
H^*_s(\mathcal{M}(D'); x_{test}) \geq p_A \geq p_B \geq \max_{c \neq c_A} H^*_s(\mathcal{M}(D'); x_{test}),
\]

then if

\[
R \sum_{i=1}^{R} (p_i \gamma_i \eta_i \frac{q_i}{n_i} \| \delta_i \|) ^2 \\
\leq \frac{1 - (\sqrt{p_A} - \sqrt{p_B})^2}{2L_Z} \prod_{t=t_{adv}+1}^{T} \left( 2 \Phi \left( \frac{\bar{w}_t}{\sigma_t} \right) - 1 \right)
\]

it is guaranteed that

\[
h_s(\mathcal{M}(D'); x_{test}) = h_s(\mathcal{M}(D); x_{test}) = c_A,
\]

where \( \Phi \) is standard Gaussian’s cumulative density function (CDF) and the other parameters are defined in Section 3.

In practice, since the server does not know the global model in the current FL system is poisoned or not, we assume the model is already backdoored and derive the condition when its prediction will be certifiably consistent with the prediction of the clean model. Our certification is on three levels: feature, sample, and client. If the magnitude of the backdoor is upper bounded for every attackers, then we can re-write the Theorem 1 as the following corollary.

**Corollary 1** (Robustness Condition in Feature Level). Using the same setting as in Theorem 1 but further assume identical backdoor magnitude \( \| \delta_i \| = \| \delta_i \| \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, R \). Suppose \( c_A \in \mathcal{Y} \) and \( p_A, p_B \in [0, 1] \) satisfy

\[
H^*_s(\mathcal{M}(D'); x_{test}) \geq p_A \geq p_B \geq \max_{c \neq c_A} H^*_s(\mathcal{M}(D); x_{test}),
\]

then \( h_s(\mathcal{M}(D'); x_{test}) = h_s(\mathcal{M}(D); x_{test}) = c_A \) for all \( \| \delta \| < \text{RAD} \), where

\[
\text{RAD} = \frac{- \log \left( 1 - (\sqrt{p_A} - \sqrt{p_B})^2 \right) \sigma_{t_{adv}}^2}{2RL_Z \sum_{i=1}^{R} (p_i \gamma_i \eta_i \frac{q_i}{n_i} \| \delta_i \|) ^2} \prod_{t=t_{adv}+1}^{T} \left( 2 \Phi \left( \frac{\bar{w}_t}{\sigma_t} \right) - 1 \right)
\]

(2)

The function CalculateRadius in our Algorithm 2 can calculate the certified radius \( \text{RAD} \) according to Corollary 1.

We now make several remarks about Corollary 1 and will verify them in our experiments: 1) The noise level \( \sigma_i \) and the parameter norm clipping threshold \( p_i \) are hyper-parameters that can be adjusted to control the robustness-accuracy tradeoff. For instance, the certified radius \( \text{RAD} \) would be large when: \( \sigma_i \) is high; \( p_i \) is small; the margin between \( p_A \) and \( p_B \) is large; the number of attackers \( R \) is small; the poison ratio \( \frac{q_i}{n_i} \) is small; the scale factor \( \gamma_i \) is small; the aggregation weights for attackers \( p_i \) is small; the local iteration \( \tau_i \) is small; and the local learning rate \( \eta_i \) is small. 2) Since \( 0 \leq 2\Phi(\cdot) - 1 \leq 1 \), the certified radius \( \text{RAD} \) goes to \( \infty \) as \( T \to \infty \) when \( \Phi(\cdot) < 1 \). Intuitively, the benign fine-tuning after backdoor injection round \( t_{adv} \) would mitigate the poisoning effect. Thus, with infinite rounds of such fine-tuning, the model is able to tolerate backdoors with arbitrarily large magnitude. In practice, we note that the continued multiplication in the denominator may not approach 0 due to numerical issues, which we will verify in the experiments section. 4) Large number of clients \( N \) will decrease the aggregation weights \( p_i \) of attackers, thus it can tolerate backdoors with large magnitude, resulting in higher \( \text{RAD} \). 5) For general neural networks, efficient computation of Lipschitz gradient constant (w.r.t. data input) is an open question, especially when the data dimension is high. We will provide a closed-form expression for \( L_Z \) under some constraints next.

As mentioned in Section 3.2, the backdoor for data sample \( z_{ij} \) includes both the backdoor pattern \( \delta_{ij} \) and adversarial...
target label flipping $\delta_t$. In Assumption 2 we define $L_Z$ with $z = (x, y)$ (concatenation of $x$ and $y$) to certify against both backdoor patterns and label-flipping effects. Without loss of generality, here we focus on backdoor patterns considering bounded model parameters in Lemma 1, which provides a closed-form expression for $L_Z$ in the case of multi-class logistic regression. By applying $L_Z$ from Lemma 1 to Theorem 1, it indicates that the prediction for a test sample is independent with the backdoor pattern so the backdoor pattern is disentangled from the adversarial target label.

**Lemma 1.** Given the upper bound on model parameters norm, i.e., $\|w\| \leq \rho$, and two data samples $z_1$ and $z_2$ with $x_1 \neq x_2$ ($y_1 = y_2$), for multi-class logistic regression (i.e., one linear layer followed by a softmax function and trained by cross-entropy loss), its Lipschitz gradient constant w.r.t data is $L_Z = \sqrt{2} + 2\rho + \rho^2$. That is,

$$||\nabla \ell(w; z_1) - \nabla \ell(w; z_2)|| \leq \sqrt{2} + 2\rho + \rho^2 ||z_1 - z_2||.$$ 

Proof for Lemma 1 is provided in the Appendix B.6.

In order to formally derive the main theorem, there are two key results. We first quantify the closeness between the FL trained models $\mathcal{M}(D')$ and $\mathcal{M}(D)$ using Markov Kernel, and then connect the model closeness to the prediction consistency through parameter smoothing.

### 5.2. Model Closeness

As described in Algorithm 1, owing to the Gaussian noise perturbation mechanism, in each iteration the global model can be viewed as a random vector with the Gaussian smoothing measure $\mu$. We use the $f$-divergence between $\mu(\mathcal{M}(D'))$ and $\mu(\mathcal{M}(D))$ as a statistical distance for measuring model closeness of the final FL model. Based on the data post-processing inequality, when we interpret each round of CRFL as a probability transition kernel, i.e., a Markov Kernel, the contraction coefficient of Markov Kernel can help bound the divergence over multiple training rounds of FL.

Let $f : (0, \infty) \to \mathbb{R}$ be a convex function with $f(1) = 0$, $\mu$ and $\nu$ be two probability distributions. Then the $f$-divergence is defined as $D_f(\mu||\nu) = E_{W \sim \nu}[f(\frac{\mu(W)}{\nu(W)})]$. Common choices of f-divergence include total variation ($f(x) = \frac{1}{2}||x - 1||$) and Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence ($f(x) = x \log x$). The data processing inequality (Raginsky, 2016; Polyanskiy & Wu, 2015; 2017) for the relative entropy states that, for any convex function $f$ and any probability transition kernel (Markov Kernel), $D_f(\mu K||\nu K) \leq D_f(\mu||\nu)$, where $\mu K$ denotes the push-forward of $\mu$ by $K$, i.e., $\mu K = \int \mu(dW) K(W)$. In other words, $D_f(\mu||\nu)$ decreases by post-processing via $K$. (Asoodeh & Calmon, 2020) extend it to analyze SGD.

In our setting, all the operations in one round of our CRFL, including SGD, clipping and noise perturbations, are incorporated as a Markov Kernel. We note that in the single-round attack setting, the adversarial clients use clean datasets to train the local models after $t_{adv}$, so the Markov operator is the same as the one in the benign training process. Therefore the $f$-divergence of the two global models (backdoored and benign) of interest decreases over rounds, which is characterized by a contraction coefficient defined in Appendix B. We quantify such contraction property of Markov Kernel for each round with the help of two hyperparameters in the server side: model parameter norm clipping threshold $\rho_i$ and the noise level $\sigma_i$, and finally bound $f$-divergence of global models in round $T$. Although our analysis can be adopted to general $f$-divergence, we here use KL divergence as an instantiation to measure the model closeness.

**Theorem 2.** When $\eta_i \leq \frac{1}{2}$ and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, the KL divergence between $\mu(\mathcal{M}(D))$ and $\mu(\mathcal{M}(D'))$ with $\mu(w) = \mathcal{N}(w | \sigma^2 I)$ is bounded as:

$$D_{KL}(\mu(\mathcal{M}(D))||\mu(\mathcal{M}(D'))) \leq \frac{2R \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left(p_i \gamma_i \eta_i \frac{\|z_t\|}{\max(\sigma^2, \sigma_{adv})} \right)^2}{\sigma_{adv}^2} \prod_{t=t_{adv}+1}^{T} \left(2\Phi\left(\frac{\rho_t}{\sigma_t}\right) - 1\right).$$

The proof is provided in the Appendix B.

### 5.3. Parameter Smoothing

We connect the model closeness to the prediction consistency by the following theorem. The smoothed classifier $h_s$ is robustly certificated at $\mu(w')$ with respect to the bounded KL divergence, $D_{KL}(\mu(w), \mu(w')) \leq \epsilon$.

**Theorem 3.** Let $h_s$ be defined as in Eq. 1. Suppose $c_A \in \mathcal{Y}$ and $p_{A}, p_B \in [0, 1]$ satisfy

$$H_{s}^{c_A}(w' ; x_{test}) \geq p_A \geq p_B \geq \max_{c \neq c_A} H_{s}^{c}(w' ; x_{test}) ,$$

then $h_s(w' ; x_{test}) = h_s(w ; x_{test}) = c_A$ for all $w$ such that $D_{KL}(\mu(w), \mu(w')) \leq \epsilon$, where

$$\epsilon = -\log\left(1 - (\sqrt{p_A} - \sqrt{p_B})^2\right).$$

The proof is provided in the Appendix C.

Finally, combining Theorem 2 and 3 leads to our main Theorem 1. In detail, Theorem 2 states that $D_{KL}(\mu(\mathcal{M}(D))||\mu(\mathcal{M}(D'))) \leq \epsilon$ under our CRFL framework is bounded by certain value that depends on the difference between $D$ and $D'$. Theorem 3 states that for a test sample $x_{test}$, as long as the KL divergence is smaller than $-\log(1 - (\sqrt{p_A} - \sqrt{p_B})^2)$, the prediction from the poisoned smoothed classifier $h_s$ that is built upon the base classifier with model parameter $\mathcal{M}(D')$ will be consistent with the prediction from $h_{s'}$ that is built upon $\mathcal{M}(D)$. Therefore, we derive the condition for $D$ and $D'$ in Theorem 1,
under which $D_{KL}(\mu(M(D))\|\mu(M(D'))) \leq -\log(1 - (\sqrt{\frac{A}{\rho}} - \sqrt{\frac{B}{\rho}})^2)$. This condition also indicates that $h_s$ built upon the model parameter $M(D')$ is certifiably robust.

**Defend against Other Potential Attack** Here we discuss the potentials to generalize our method against other training-time attacks. 1) Our method can naturally extend to fixed-frequency attack by applying our analysis for each attack period. In particular, we can repeatedly apply our Theorem 2 to analyze model closeness for each attack period, and the different initializations of each period can be bounded based on its last period. Then Theorem 3 can be applied to connect model closeness to certify the prediction consistency. 2) (Wang et al., 2020) introduce edge-case adversarial training samples to enforce the model to misclassify inputs on the tail of input distribution. The edge-case attack essentially conducts a special semantic attack (Bagdasaryan et al., 2020) by selecting rare images instead of directly adding backdoor patterns. It is possible to apply our framework against such attack by viewing it as the whole sample manipulation.

**Comparison with Differentially Private Federated Learning** In order to protect the privacy of each client, differentially private federated learning (DPFL) mechanisms are proposed (Geyer et al., 2017; McMahan et al., 2018; Agrawal et al., 2018) to ensure that the learned FL model is essentially unchanged when one individual client is modified. Compared with DPFL, our method has several fundamental differences and addresses additional challenges: 1) Mechanisms: DPFL approaches add training-time noise to provide privacy guarantee, while ours add smoothing noise during training and testing to provide certified robustness against data poisoning. In general, the added noise in CRFL does not need to be as large as that in DPFL to provide strong privacy guarantee, and therefore preserve higher model utility. 2) Certification goals: DPFL approaches provide client-level privacy guarantee for the learned model parameters, while in CRFL the robustness guarantee is derived for certified pointwise prediction which could be on the feature, samples and clients levels. 3) Technical contributions: DPFL approaches derive DP guarantee via DP composition theorems (Dwork et al., 2014; Abadi et al., 2016), while we quantify the global model deviation via Markov Kernel and verify the robustness properties of the smoothed model via parameter smoothing.

**6. Experiments**

In our experiments, the attackers perform the model replacement attack at round $t_{adv}$ during our CRFL training, and the server performs parameter smoothing on a possibly backdoored FL model at round $T$ to calculate the certified radius $RAD$ for each test sample based on Corollary 1. Specifically, we evaluate the effect of the training time noise $\sigma_t$, the attacker’s ability which includes the number of attackers $m$, the poison ratio $\frac{\theta}{\mu}$, and the scale factor $\gamma$, robust aggregation protocol, the number of total clients $N$ and the number of training rounds $T$. Moreover, we evaluate the model closeness empirically to justify Theorem 2.

**6.1. Experiment Setup**

We focus on multi-class logistic regression (one linear layer with softmax function and cross-entropy loss), which is a convex classification problem. We train the FL system following our CRFL framework with three datasets: Lending Club Loan Data (LOAN) (Kan, 2019), MNIST (LeCun & Cortes, 2010), and EMNIST (Cohen et al., 2017). We refer the readers to Appendix A for more details about the datasets, parameter setups and attack setting. We train the FL global model until convergence and then use our certification in Algorithm 2 for robustness evaluation.

The metrics of interest are certified rate and certified accuracy. Given a test set of size $m$, for $i$-th test sample, the ground truth label is $y_i$, and the output prediction is either $c_i$ with the certified radius $RAD_i$ or $c_i = ABSTAIN$ with $RAD_i = 0$. Then we calculate certified rate at $r$ as $\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathbb{1}\{RAD_i \geq r\}$, and certified accuracy at $r$ as $\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathbb{1}\{c_i = y_i \text{ and } RAD_i \geq r\}$. The certified rate is the fraction of the test set that can be certified at radius $RAD \geq r$, which reveals how consistent the possibly backdoored classifier’s prediction with the clean classifier’s prediction. The certified accuracy is the fraction of the test set for which the possibly backdoored classifier makes correct and consistent predictions with the clean model. In the displayed figures, there is a critical radius beyond which the certified accuracy and certified rate are dropped to zero. Since each test sample has its own calculated certified radius $RAD_i$, this critical value is a threshold that none of them have a larger radius than it, similar to the findings in (Cohen et al., 2019). We certified 10000/5000/10000 samples from the LOAN/MNIST/EMNIST test sets. In all experiments, unless otherwise stated, we use $\sigma_T = 0.01$ to generate $M = 1000$ noisy models in parameter smoothing procedure, and use the error tolerance $\alpha = 0.001$. In our experiments, we adopt the expression of $L_Z$ in Lemma 1. $L_Z$ can be generalized to other poisoning settings by specifying $z_1, z_2$ in Assumption 2 under the case of “$x_1 \neq x_2$ and $y_1 \neq y_2$” or “$x_1 = x_2$ and $y_1 \neq y_2$”.

**6.2. Experiment Results**

We only change one factor in each experiment and keep others the same as the experiment setup. We plot the certified accuracy and certified rate on the clean test set, and report the results on the backdoored test set in Appendix A.
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(a) Certified rate on MNIST  
(b) Certified acc. on MNIST  
(c) Certified acc. on LOAN  
(d) Certified acc. on EMNIST

Figure 2. Certified accuracy and certified rate on MNIST, LOAN, and EMNIST with different training-time noise $\sigma$. Solid lines represent certified accuracy; dashed lines of the same color show the accuracy of base classifier trained with $\sigma$; black dashed line presents the accuracy of the classifier trained without noise.

Effect of Training Time Noise Since we aim to defend against backdoor attack, the training time noise $\sigma$ ($\sigma = \sigma_t, t < T$) in our Algorithm 1 is more essential than $\sigma_T$ in parameter smoothing (Algorithm 2). The reason is that $\sigma$ can nullify the malicious model updates at early stage. Figure 2 plots the certified accuracy and certified rate attained by training FL system with different $\sigma$. In Figure 2(a), when $\sigma$ is high, certified rate is high at every $r$ and large radius can be certified. Figure 2(b)(c)(d) show that large radius is certified but at a low accuracy, so the parameter noise $\sigma$ controls the trade-off between certifiability and accuracy, which echoes the property of evasion-attack certification (Cohen et al., 2019). Comparing the solid line with the dashed line for each color, we can see that the parameter smoothing with $\sigma_T$ does not hurt the accuracy much.

Effect of Attacker Ability From the perspective of attackers, the larger number of attackers $R$, the larger poison ratio $q_{Bi}/n_{Bi}$ and the larger scale factor $\gamma_i$ result in the stronger attack. Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 show that in the three datasets, the stronger the attack, the smaller radius can be certified. After training sufficient number of rounds with clean datasets after $t_{adv}$, we show that the certified radius is not sensitive to the attack timing $t_{adv}$ in Appendix A.2.

Effect of Robust Aggregation Our CRFL can be used to assess different robust aggregation rules. Figure 6 presents the certified accuracy on MNIST and EMNIST as $R$ is varied, when our CRFL adopts the robust aggregation algorithm RFA (Pillutla et al., 2019), which detects outliers and down-weights the malicious updates during aggregation. Comparing FedAvg in Figure 5 with RFA in Figure 6 (the magnitude of x-axis is different), we observe that very large radius can be certified under RFA. This is because that the attacker is assigned with very low aggregation weights $p_i$, which is part of our bound in Eq. 2. Our certified radius reveals that RFA is much robust than FedAvg, which shows the potential usage of our certified radius as an evaluation metric for the robustness of other robust aggregation rules.

Effect of Client Number Distributed learning across a large number of clients is an important property of FL. Figure 7 shows that large radius can be certified when $N$ is large (i.e., more clients can tolerate larger backdoor magnitude), because it decreases the aggregation weights $p_i$ of attackers. Moreover, the backdoor effect could be mitigated by more benign model updates during training.

Effect of Training Rounds According to Figure 8, the certified accuracy is higher when $T$ is larger. However, the largest radius that can be certified for the test set does not increase. We note that this is due to numerical issues of the standard Gaussian CDF $\Phi(\cdot)$. As we mentioned in Section 5.1, the continued multiplication in the denominator of Eq. 2 will not achieve 0 in practice. Otherwise the certified radius $\text{RAD}$ goes to $\infty$ as $T \to \infty$ since $0 \leq 2\Phi(\rho/\sigma) - 1 \leq 1$.

To verify our argument, we fix $p_A$ and $p_B$ to be 0.7 and 0.1, use default values for other parameters, and study the relationship between $\rho/\sigma$, $T$ and $\text{RAD}$ in Figure 9(b). When $\rho/\sigma$ is larger than certain threshold, the certified radius $\text{RAD}$ does not change much when $T$ increases. If one wishes to increase $T$ for improving certified radius, then we suggest...
to keep $\rho/\sigma$ smaller than the threshold to make effect. The increased certified accuracy when $T$ is large in Figure 8 could be attributed to improved model performance up to convergence, so the margin between $p_A - p_B$ is widened.

We also study the error tolerance $\alpha$ and the number of noisy models $M$ in Appendix A.2. Larger $M$ yields larger certified radius, and the certified radius is not very sensitive to $\alpha$.

**Empirical Evaluation on Model Closeness** Our theorems are derived based on the analysis in comparison to a "virtual" benign training process. Empirically, we train such FL global model under the benign training process and compare the $\ell_2$ distance between the clean global model and the backdoored global model at every round. In Figure 9(a), one attacker performs model replacement attack on MNIST at round $t_{adv} = \{20, 40, 60\}$ respectively. We can observe that the plotted $\ell_2$ distance over the FL training rounds after $t_{adv}$ is decreasing, which echos our assumption that because all clients behave normal and use their clean local datasets to purify the global model after $t_{adv}$, the global models between two training process become close. This observation also can justfy the model closeness statement in Theorem 2.

**7. Conclusion**

This paper establishes the first framework (CRFL) on certifiably robust federated learning against backdoor attacks. CRFL employs model parameter clipping and perturbing during training, and uses model parameter smoothing during testing, to certify conditions under which a backdoored model will give consistent predictions with an oracle clean model. Our theoretical analysis characterizes the relation between certified robustness and federated learning parameters, which are empirically verified on three different datasets.

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