On the Limitations of Markovian Rewards
to Express Multi-Objective, Risk-Sensitive, and Modal Tasks

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Abstract

In this paper, we study the expressivity of scalar, Markovian reward functions in Reinforcement Learning (RL), and identify several limitations to what they can express. Specifically, we look at three classes of RL tasks; multi-objective RL, risk-sensitive RL, and modal RL. For each class, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions that describe when a problem in this class can be expressed using a scalar, Markovian reward. Moreover, we find that scalar, Markovian rewards are unable to express most of the instances in each of these three classes. We thereby contribute to a more complete understanding of what standard reward functions can and cannot express. In addition to this, we also call attention to modal problems as a new class of problems, since they have so far not been given any systematic treatment in the RL literature. We also briefly outline some approaches for solving some of the problems we discuss, by means of bespoke RL algorithms.

1 INTRODUCTION

To solve a task using reinforcement learning (RL), we must first encode that tasks as a reward function [Sutton and Barto, 2018]. Typically, these rewards are *scalar* and *Markovian*. However, it is often not straightforward to determine if a given task *can* be adequately expressed using such a reward function. Therefore, understanding the expressivity of scalar, Markovian rewards is a basic and foundational question of the RL setting. In this paper, we identify and characterise several specific limitations in the expressivity of scalar, Markovian rewards. Specifically, we examine three broad classes of tasks, all of which are both intuitive to understand, and useful in many practical situations. We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions that describe

when these tasks can be expressed using ordinary reward functions, and consequently show that *almost no* tasks in any of these three classes can be expressed using scalar, Markovian rewards. This suggests that scalar, Markovian reward functions are semantically limited in certain important ways. We thus contribute to a more complete understanding of what standard reward functions can and cannot express. This clarifies the implicit assumptions behind many common RL techniques, and makes it easier to determine if they are applicable to a given practical problem.

The first class of problems we look at, in Section 3, are single-policy, multi-objective RL tasks (MORL). In such problems, the agent receives multiple reward signals, and the aim is to learn a single policy that achieves an optimal trade-off amongst those rewards, according to some specified criterion [Roijers et al., 2013, Liu et al., 2015]. For example, a single-policy MORL algorithm might attempt to maximise the rewards lexicographically [Skalse et al., 2022b]. We will provide necessary and sufficient conditions describing when a MORL problem can be reduced to scalar-reward RL, by providing a single reward function that induces the same preferences as the MORL problem. We find that this can *only* be done for MORL problems that correspond to a linear weighting of the rewards, which means that it cannot be done for the vast majority of all interesting MORL problems. This result is analogous to Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem Harsanyi [1955], generalised to the RL setting.

The next class of problems we study, in Section 4, is risks-sensitive RL. In expected utility theory, risk-aversion is often modelled using utility functions that are concave in some of their variables. We will show that these tasks cannot be expressed as Markovian reward functions, by demonstrating that no non-affine monotonic transformations of the trajectory return function are possible. This demonstrates another limitation in the expressive power of Markovian rewards.

In Section 5, we introduce a new class of tasks, which we call *modal* tasks. These are tasks where the agent is evaluated not only based on what distribution of trajectories it

generates, but also based on what it *could have done* along those trajectories. As an example, consider the instruction "you should always be *able* to return to the start state". We provide a formalisation of such tasks, argue that there are many situations in which these tasks could be useful, and finally prove that these tasks also typically cannot be formalised using scalar, Markovian reward functions.

In Section 6, we discuss how to solve tasks from each of these classes using specialised RL solutions: we provide references to existing literature, and also sketch both an approach for learning a wide class of MORL problems, and an approach for learning a wide class of modal problems. Finally, in Section 7, we discuss the implications of our results, together with several pieces of related work.

2 PRELIMINARIES

The standard RL setting is formalised using *Markov Decision Processes* (MDPs) Sutton and Barto [2018], which are tuples $\langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \tau, \mu_0, R, \gamma \rangle$ where $\mathcal{S}$ is a set of states, $\mathcal{A}$ is a set of actions, $\tau : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \to \Delta(\mathcal{S})$ is a transition function, μ_0 is an initial state distribution over $\mathcal{S}$, $R : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \to \mathbb{R}$ is a reward function, and $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ is a discount factor. A *trajectory* ξ is in general an element of $(\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$, i.e. a sequence $s_0, a_0, s_1 \ldots$. We use G to denote the *trajectory return function*, where $G(\xi) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R(s_t, a_t)$. A *policy* is a mapping $\pi : \mathcal{S} \to \Delta(\mathcal{A})$, and Π is the set of all policies. Given a policy π, its *value function* $V^\pi : \mathcal{S} \to \mathbb{R}$ is the function where $V^\pi(s)$ is the expected future discounted reward when following π from s, and its *Q-function* Q^π is $\mathbb{E}_{s' \sim \tau(s,a)}[R(s, a) + \gamma \cdot V^\pi(s')]$. The *policy evaluation function* $J : \Pi \to \mathbb{R}$ is $J(\pi) = \mathbb{E}_{s_0 \sim \mu_0}[V^\pi(s_o)]$. If a policy maximises J, then we say that this policy is *optimal*. We denote optimal policies by $\pi^\star$, and their value function and Q-function by $V^\star$ and $Q^\star$. Moreover, given an MDP $\mathcal{M}$, we say that $\mathcal{M}$'s policy order is the ordering $\prec$ on Π where $\pi_1 \prec \pi_2 \iff J(\pi_1) < J(\pi_2)$ for any π_1, π_2.

In this paper, we will say that a reward function R is *trivial* if $J(\pi_1) = J(\pi_2)$ for all π_1, π_2. Moreover, we say that R_1 and R_2 are *equivalent* if $J_1(\pi_1) < J_1(\pi_2) \iff J_2(\pi_1) < J_2(\pi_2)$ for all π_1, π_2, and that they are *opposites* if $J_1(\pi_1) < J_1(\pi_2) \iff J_2(\pi_1) > J_2(\pi_2)$ for all π_1, π_2.

MORL problems are formalised using *Multi-Objective MDPs* (MOMDPs), which are tuples $\langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \tau, \mu_0, \mathbf{R}, \gamma \rangle$, with the only difference from MDPs being $\mathbf{R}$, which is now a function $\mathbf{R} : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \to \mathbb{R}^k$ that, for each pair (s, a), returns k different rewards (for some finite k). We denote the i'th component of $\mathbf{R}$ as the scalar reward function R_i, and use V_i^π, Q_i^π, J_i, and G_i, etc, to refer to its value-, Q-, evaluation-, and return function, etc. There are two types of MORL problems; single-policy MORL, where the goal is to compute one policy that achieves an optimal trade-off of the rewards, and multi-policy MORL, where the aim is to compute several policies (typically with the aim of approximating the Pareto front of the rewards). In this paper, we are concerned with single-policy MORL. Since there may not be a single policy that maximises each component of $\mathbf{R}$, a single-policy MORL problem needs some additional rule for combining and trading off each reward.

In economics and psychology, risk-aversion is often modelled using utility functions $U(c)$ that are concave in some relevant variable c. The most common risk-averse utility functions are the *exponential*, the *isoelastic*, and the *quadratic* utility functions. The exponential utility function is given by $U(c) = -e^{\alpha c}$, where $\alpha > 0$ is a parameter controlling the degree of risk aversion. The isoelastic utility function is given by $U(c) = c^{1-\alpha}$, for $\alpha > 0, \alpha \neq 1$, or by $U(c) = \ln(c)$ (corresponding to the case when $\alpha = 1$). The quadratic utility function is given by $U(c) = c - \alpha c^2$, where $\alpha > 0$. Since this function is decreasing for sufficiently large c, its domain is typically restricted to $(-\infty, 1/2\alpha]$.

A Remark on "Tasks": In this paper, we are investigating the question of when a given task can be expressed using a scalar, Markovian reward function. To do this, we must first formalise what it should mean for a reward function to "express a task". One option is to say that a task corresponds to a desired policy π, and that a reward function R expresses the task if π is optimal under R (possibly with the additional requirement that π is the *only* policy that is optimal under R). With this definition, we find that *any* task can be expressed as a Markovian reward function, at least as long as π is stationary and deterministic (see Appendix B). With this definition, the problem is therefore rather trivial.

An alternative, stronger formalisation is to say that a task corresponds to an ordering $\prec$ on Π, which encodes a preference ordering over all policies, and that a reward function R expresses the task if its corresponding evaluation function J orders Π according to $\prec$. It is primarily this latter definition that we will use in this paper. The main reason for this is that it is often impossible to find the optimal policy in complex environments. For example, in a robotics problem, it is typically not feasible to find a policy that is globally optimal. This means that it is not enough for R to admit the correct optimal policy; it must also induce the right preferences between the all the (sub-optimal) policies that the policy synthesis algorithm might in fact generate. The only way to robustly ensure that this is the case is if R induces the right policy ordering. For this reason, we think it is more informative to think of a problem setting (i.e. a "task") as corresponding to an ordering on Π.

3 MULTI-OBJECTIVE PROBLEMS

In this section, we examine the MORL setting. We first need a general definition of what a single-policy MORL problem is. Recall that a MOMDP $\langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \tau, \mu_0, \mathbf{R}, \gamma \rangle$ by itself has no

one canonical objective to maximise. We therefore introduce the notion of a *MORL objective*:

Definition 1. *A **MORL objective** over k rewards is a function $\mathcal{O}$ that takes k policy evaluation functions $J_1 \ldots J_k$ and returns a (total) ordering $\prec_{\mathcal{O}}$ over the set of all policies Π.*

Given a MOMDP $\mathcal{M}$, a MORL objective $\mathcal{O}$ gives us an ordering $\prec_{\mathcal{O}}$ over Π that tells us when a policy is preferred over another. For the purposes of this paper, we will not need to impose any further requirements on $\prec_{\mathcal{O}}$. For example, we will not insist that $\prec_{\mathcal{O}}$ must have a greatest element in Π, or that $\pi_1 \prec_O \pi_2$ whenever π_2 is a Pareto improvement over π_1, etc, even though a reasonable MORL objective presumably would have these properties. We next provide a few examples of MORL objectives, where we denote by π_1, π_2 any given pair of distinct policies.

Definition 2. *Given $J_1 \ldots J_k$, the **LexMax** objective $\prec_{Lex}$ is given by $\pi_1 \prec_{Lex} \pi_2$ iff there is an $i \in \{1 \ldots k\}$ such that $J_i(\pi_1) < J_i(\pi_2)$ and $J_j(\pi_1) = J_j(\pi_2)$ for all $j < i$.*

Definition 3. *Given $J_1 \ldots J_k$, the **MaxMin** objective $\prec_{Min}$ is given by $\pi_1 \prec_{Min} \pi_2 \iff \min_i J_i(\pi_1) < \min_i J_i(\pi_2)$.*

Definition 4. *Given $J_1 \ldots J_k$ and some $c_1 \ldots c_m \in \mathbb{R}$, the **MaxSat** objective $\prec_{Sat}$ is given by $\pi_1 \prec_{Sat} \pi_2$ if and only if the number of rewards that satisfy $J_i(\pi_1) \geq c_i$ is larger than the number of rewards that satisfy $J_i(\pi_2) \geq c_i$.*

Definition 5. *Given J_1, J_2 and some $c \in \mathbb{R}$, the **ConSat** objective $\prec_{Con}$ is given by $\pi_1 \prec_{Con} \pi_2$ if and only if either $J_1(\pi_1) < c$ and $J_1(\pi_1) < J_1(\pi_2)$, or $J_1(\pi_1), J_1(\pi_2) \geq c$ and $J_2(\pi_1) < J_2(\pi_2)$.*

In other words, the LexMax objective has *lexicographic* preferences over $R_1 \ldots R_m$, so that policies are first ordered by their expected discounted R_1-reward, and then policies that obtain the same expected discounted R_1-reward are ordered by their expected discounted R_2-reward, and so on. The MaxMin objective orders policies by their *worst* performance according to any of $R_1 \ldots R_m$ (which could be used to obtain worst-case guarantees). The MaxSat objective only cares whether a policy reaches a certain *threshold* for each reward, and ranks policies based on how many thresholds they reach. The ConSat objective aims to maximise J_2, but under the constraint that J_1 reaches a certain threshold. Note that these objectives are not necessarily the most important MORL objectives. Rather, they are simply a short list of illustrative examples, meant to demonstrate the flexibility of the MORL framework, and give an intuition for what types of problems it can be used to express. A few more examples can be found in Appendix C.

We next define what it means to *reduce* a MORL problem to a scalar RL problem. Given a MORL objective $\mathcal{O}$ and a MOMDP $\mathcal{M}$, we use $\prec_{\mathcal{O}}^{\mathcal{M}}$ to denote the ordering we get when we apply $\mathcal{O}$ to $\mathcal{M}$'s policy evaluation functions:

Definition 6. *A MOMDP $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \tau, \mu_0, \mathbf{R}, \gamma \rangle$ with MORL objective $\mathcal{O}$ is **equivalent** to the MDP $\mathcal{M}' = \langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \tau, \mu_0, R, \gamma \rangle$ if and only if $\mathcal{M}'$'s policy order is $\prec_{\mathcal{O}}^{\mathcal{M}}$. We then say that $\mathcal{M}$ with $\mathcal{O}$ is **scalarized** by R. If $\mathcal{M}$ with $\mathcal{O}$ is scalarized by some R then we say that $\mathcal{M}$ with $\mathcal{O}$ is **scalarizable**, otherwise we say that it is **unscalarizable**.*

Note that $\mathcal{M}'$ must have the same states, actions, transition function, initial state distribution, and discount factor, as $\mathcal{M}$. This definition therefore says that $\mathcal{M}$ with $\mathcal{O}$ is equivalent to $\mathcal{M}'$ if $\mathcal{M}'$ is given by replacing $\mathbf{R} = \langle R_1 \ldots R_k \rangle$ with a single reward function R, and R induces the same preferences between all policies as $\mathcal{O}(J_1 \ldots J_k)$. Note also that we require R to express the same *policy order* as $\mathcal{O}(J_1 \ldots J_k)$; it is not enough for R and $\mathcal{O}(J_1 \ldots J_k)$ to have the same *optimal policies* (see Section 2).

Given this definition, we can now provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for when a MORL problem can be reduced to a scalar-reward RL problem. All proofs are provided in the supplementary material.

Theorem 1. *If a MOMDP $\mathcal{M}$ with objective $\mathcal{O}$ is scalarizable, then there exist $w_1 \ldots w_k \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $\mathcal{M}$ with $\mathcal{O}$ is scalarized by the reward $R(s, a) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} w_i \cdot R_i(s, a)$.*

Theorem 1 tells us that a MORL objective can be expressed using a scalar, Markovian reward function if and only if that objective corresponds to a linear weighting of the individual rewards. In other words, scalar, Markovian rewards are unable to express all non-linear MORL problems. As we will see, this imposes a strong limitation on what MORL tasks can be encoded using scalar, Markovian rewards.

It is worth noting that Theorem 1 is analogous to Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem Harsanyi [1955] from social choice theory, but generalised to the RL setting. In brief, this theorem supposes that we have a finite set of outcomes Ω and a group of individuals $\{1 \ldots k\}$ with different preferences over Ω, and that we wish to construct an aggregate preference structure that captures the preferences of the group. Moreover, also suppose that (1) the preferences of each individual i are described by a utility function $U_i : \Omega \to \mathbb{R}$, (2) the aggregate preferences of the group are described by a further utility function $U_G : \Omega \to \mathbb{R}$, and (3) for all distributions $\mathcal{D}_1$ and $\mathcal{D}_2$ over Ω, if $\mathbb{E}_{O \sim \mathcal{D}_1}[U_i(O)] = \mathbb{E}_{O \sim \mathcal{D}_2}[U_i(O)]$ for every individual i, then $\mathbb{E}_{O \sim \mathcal{D}_1}[U_G(O)] = \mathbb{E}_{O \sim \mathcal{D}_2}[U_G(O)]$. Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem then says that U_G must be given by some linear combination of $U_1 \ldots U_k$. The link to Theorem 1 becomes clear if we think of Ω as being the set of all trajectories which are possible in a MOMDP $\mathcal{M}$, $U_1 \ldots U_k$ as being the trajectory return functions $G_1 \ldots G_k$ of the reward functions $R_1 \ldots R_k$ in $\mathcal{M}$, and U_G as being the trajectory return function of the scalarizing reward R. However, note that Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem assumes that Ω is finite, whereas the set of all trajectories may be uncountably infinite. Moreover, assumption (3) quantifies

over all possible distributions over Ω, whereas Theorem 1 only quantifies over distributions that can be realised as policies in a given MOMDP $\mathcal{M}$. If Ω is allowed to be infinite, and assumption (3) is restricted to range over only some distributions over Ω, then Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem does not hold in general. The generalisation provided by Theorem 1 is therefore non-trivial.

Theorem 1 also entails the following corollary, which is useful to elucidate when a MORL objective cannot be expressed using scalar reward functions. Given an ordering $\prec$ over Π, depending on some evaluation functions $J_1 \ldots J_k$, we say that a function $U : \Pi \to \mathbb{R}$ *represents* $\prec$ if $U(\pi_1) < U(\pi_2) \iff \pi_1 \prec \pi_2$. We say that U is a *linear representation* if $U(\pi) = f(\sum_{i=1}^{k} w_i \cdot J_i(\pi))$ for some $w_1 \ldots w_k \in \mathbb{R}$ and some strictly monotonic f.

Corollary 1. *If $\mathcal{O}(J_1 \ldots J_k)$ has a non-linear representation U, and $\mathcal{M}$ is a MOMDP whose J-functions are $J_1 \ldots J_k$, then $\mathcal{M}$ with $\mathcal{O}$ is unscalarizable.*

Therefore, we can prove that $\mathcal{M}$ with $\mathcal{O}$ is unscalarizable by finding a non-linear representation of $\prec_{\mathcal{O}}^{\mathcal{M}}$. Accordingly, we now show that none of the MORL objectives given in Definitions 2-5 can be expressed using scalar, Markovian reward functions, except in a few degenerate cases.

Corollary 2. *$\mathcal{M}$ with **LexMax** is unscalarizable, as long as $\mathcal{M}$ has at least two reward functions that are neither trivial, equivalent, or opposite.*

Note that if all reward functions are either trivial, equivalent, or opposite, then the only reward function that matters for **LexMax** is the highest-priority non-trivial reward function. In that case, $\mathcal{M}$ with **LexMax** is equivalent to the MDP which contains only this reward function.

Corollary 3. *$\mathcal{M}$ with **MaxMin** is unscalarizable, unless $\mathcal{M}$ has a reward function R_i such that $J_i(\pi) \leq J_j(\pi)$ for all $j \in \{1 \ldots k\}$ and all π.*

Note that if $\mathcal{M}$ has a reward function R_i such that $J_i(\pi) \leq J_j(\pi)$ for all j and π, then this is the only reward function that matters for the **MaxMin** objective. In that case, $\mathcal{M}$ with **MaxMin** is equivalent to the MDP which contains only R_i.

Corollary 4. *$\mathcal{M}$ with **MaxSat** is unscalarizable, as long as $\mathcal{M}$ has at least one reward R_i where $J_i(\pi_1) < c_i$ and $J_i(\pi_2) \geq c_i$ for some $\pi_1, \pi_2 \in \Pi$.*

Note that if $\mathcal{M}$ has no reward R_i where $J_i(\pi_1) < c_i$ and $J_i(\pi_2) \geq c_i$ for some $\pi_1, \pi_2 \in \Pi$, then either all policies satisfy all constraints, or no policy satisfies any constraint. In either case, $\mathcal{M}$ with **MaxSat** would be equivalent to an MDP with a trivial reward function.

Corollary 5. *$\mathcal{M}$ with **ConSat** is unscalarizable, unless either R_1 and R_2 are equivalent, or $\max_\pi J_1(\pi) \leq c$, or $\min_\pi J_1(\pi) \geq c$.*

Note that if $\max_\pi J_1(\pi) \leq c$ then no policy satisfies the constraint, in which case $\mathcal{M}$ with **ConSat** is equivalent to the MDP with R_1. If $\min_\pi J_1(\pi) \geq c$ then all policies satisfy the constraint, in which case $\mathcal{M}$ with **ConSat** is equivalent to the MDP with R_2. If R_1 and R_2 are equivalent, then $\mathcal{M}$ with **ConSat** is scalarized by R_1 or R_2.

Corollaries 2-5 thus show that none of the MORL objectives given in Definition 2-5 can be expressed using a scalar, Markovian reward function, except in a few degenerate cases where those MORL objectives are trivialised. This demonstrates that MORL problems typically cannot be scalarized in a satisfactory way.

To get an intuition for this result, note that the expected cumulative return of a Markovian reward function always is maximised by some stationary policy, whereas some of these MORL objectives may require the optimal policy to be non-stationary. For example, consider the **MaxMin** objective, and suppose the agent can choose between an action giving one R_1-reward, and an action giving one R_2-reward. Then the optimal choice may depend on how much R_1 and R_2-reward the agent has got in the past. This means that the optimal policy may be non-stationary, and thus not correspond to any Markovian reward.

4 RISK-SENSITIVE PROBLEMS

The next area we will look at is that of *risk-sensitive* RL. An ordinary RL agent tries to maximise the *expectation* of its reward function. However, there are many cases where it is natural to require the agent to be *risk-averse*. For example, we might prefer a policy that reliably achieves 5 reward, over one that achieves 11 reward with probability 0.5, and otherwise gets 0 reward, even though the latter policy achieves a higher expected reward. In this section, we will examine when scalar, Markovian reward functions can be used to encourage such behaviour.

In expected utility theory, risk-aversion is often modelled using concave utility functions. In particular, suppose we have a set of *outcomes* C, each of which is associated with some utility via a function $U_1 : C \to \mathbb{R}$. We can then construct a second utility function $U_2 : C \to \mathbb{R}$ by letting $U_2(c) = f(U_1(c))$ for some concave function f. Then, an agent which maximises expected utility according to U_2, will be risk-averse with respect to utility as defined by U_1. For example, suppose each outcome is associated with some monetary payoff, and that U_1 measures how much money is obtained in each outcome. If we were to maximise expected utility according to U_1, then we would prefer a 50% chance of obtaining $2,000,000$, to a certain chance of obtaining $900,000$. However, in the real world, most people would prefer the latter option. One reason for this is that, while getting $2,000,000$ is better than getting $900,000$, it is less than twice as good. We can model these preferences

by using a second utility function U_2 that is concave in U_1. Intuitively, U_2 should measure how much *benefit* we get from the money. Then the expected U_2-utility might be higher for the safe option than the risky option, even though the expected U_1-utility is higher for the risky option.

In reinforcement learning, the *outcomes* are the trajectories that might occur in the environment, and the *utility* of a trajectory ξ is induced by the reward function R via the return function, G. If the transition function τ is nondeterministic, then the agent cannot reliably enact a particular outcome (i.e., move along a particular trajectory), but can instead only choose between some distributions over outcomes. By default, the agent may then be compelled to pursue a policy that achieves a high reward with small probability, as long as the expectation remains high. A natural question is then whether we could avoid this by constructing a second reward function that is concave in the original reward function, similar to what is done in expected utility theory. That is, given a reward function R_1 and a concave function f, can we construct a second reward function R_2 such that $G_2 = f(G_1)$? Our next theorem demonstrates that this is impossible. As before, the proof is in the appendix.

Theorem 2. *Given $\mathcal{S}$, $\mathcal{A}$, and γ, let R_1 and R_2 be two reward functions. If $\gamma \geq 0.5$, and for all $\xi_1, \xi_2 \in (\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$,*

$$G_1(\xi_1) \leq G_1(\xi_2) \iff G_2(\xi_1) \leq G_2(\xi_2),$$

then $\exists a \in \mathbb{R}$, $b \in \mathbb{R} > 0$ such that for all $\xi \in (\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$,

$$G_1(\xi) = b \cdot G_2(\xi) + a.$$

Theorem 2 effectively tells us that *only affine transformations of G are possible*. From this result, it straightforwardly follows that none of the standard risk-averse utility functions (exponential utility, isoelastic utility, and quadratic utility) can be expressed using Markovian reward functions:

Corollary 6. *For any non-trivial reward R_1 and any constant $\alpha \neq 0$, if $\gamma \geq 0.5$ then there is no reward R_2 such that $G_2(\xi) = -e^{\alpha G_1(\xi)}$ for all $\xi \in (\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$.*

Corollary 7. *For any non-trivial reward R_1 and any constant $\alpha > 0$, $\alpha \neq 1$, if $\gamma \geq 0.5$ then there is no reward R_2 such that $G_2(\xi) = G_1(\xi)^{1-\alpha}$ for all $\xi \in (\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$.*

Corollary 8. *For any non-trivial reward R_1, if $\gamma \geq 0.5$ then there is no reward R_2 such that $G_2(\xi) = \ln(G_1(\xi))$ for all $\xi \in (\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$.*

Corollary 9. *For any non-trivial reward R_1 and any $\alpha > 0$ where $\max_\xi G_1(\xi) \leq \frac{1}{2\alpha}$, if $\gamma \geq 0.5$ then there is no reward R_2 such that $G_2(\xi) = G_1(\xi) - \alpha G_1(\xi)^2$ for all $\xi \in (\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$.*

Theorem 2 thus implies that none of the standard risk-averse utility functions can be expressed using scalar, Markovian

reward functions. To get an intuition on Theorem 2, consider the fact that the expected cumulative return of a Markovian reward function always is maximised by some stationary (i.e. Markovian) policy. However, a risk-averse objective may require the optimal policy to be non-stationary, because whether or not it is worth taking a particular gamble could depend on how much reward you have accrued in the past. This suggests that there should be instances where risk-sensitive objectives cannot be expressed as Markovian reward functions. Theorem 2 formalises this intuition.

It is also worth remarking on the fact that Theorem 2 considers the value of G_1 and G_2 for *all* trajectories in $(\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$. For any particular transition function τ, most of these trajectories are likely to be impossible (unless τ allows you to transition between any two states via any action with non-zero probability). We could therefore alternatively consider the condition where $G_1(\xi_1) \leq G_1(\xi_2) \iff G_2(\xi_1) \leq G_2(\xi_2)$ for those trajectories ξ_1, ξ_2 that are possible in a given environment. In this case, it *can* be possible for G_2 to be non-affine in G_1. For example, consider the case of a tree-shaped MDP, where $\tau(s, a) = s$ and $R_1(s, a) = 0$ for all actions a if s is a leaf-node. In that case, G_2 can be an arbitrary transformation of G_1. However, to construct the corresponding reward function R_2, we would need to have a detailed understanding of the environment (which is against the main tenet in RL), and furthermore the resulting reward function would no longer induce the same behaviour if it were used in a different environment. For this reason, we believe that it is more relevant to consider the set of all trajectories in $(\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A})^\omega$. Nonetheless, an interesting direction for further work could be to more extensively study what happens if the set of trajectories under consideration is restricted in various ways.

Finally, note that Theorem 2 assumes that the discount parameter $\gamma \geq 0.5$. It is not clear if this is strictly necessary, so it might be possible to generalise Theorem 2 by removing this requirement. This would, however, require a different proof strategy. Nonetheless, this assumption is not very restrictive, as in practice γ is almost always set to be greater than 0.5 (typically $\gamma \geq 0.9$).

5 MODAL PROBLEMS

The final class of problems that we will examine is a class of tasks that we refer to as *modal* tasks. Before we give a formal definition of this class, we will first provide some intuition. In analytic philosophy, a distinction is made between *categorical* facts and *modal* facts. In short, categorical facts only concern what is true in actuality, whereas modal facts concern what must be true, could have been true, or cannot be true, etc. For example, it is a categorical fact that the Eiffel Tower is brown, and a modal fact that it *could have had* a different colour. It is (arguably) a categorical fact that the number 3 is prime, and a modal fact that it *could*

not have been otherwise. To give another example, there is a difference between stating that *nothing can travel faster than light* and that *nothing does travel faster than light* – the former statement, which is modal, is stronger than the latter, which is categorical. One can further distinguish between different kinds of possibility (e.g. logical vs physical possibility, etc), and discussions about modality also involves topics such as *causality* and *counterfactuals*, etc. A complete treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, but for an overview see Menzel [2021].

Modality does of course relate to *modal logic*, and thus also to *temporal logic*. In particular, computational tree logic (CTL, see e.g. Baier and Katoen [2008]), and its extensions, can express many modal statements. [1]

The intuition behind this section is that a reward function always is expressed in terms of categorical facts, whereas many tasks are naturally expressed in terms of modal facts. For example, consider an instruction such as "you should always be *able* to return to the start state". This instruction seems quite reasonable, but it is not obvious how to translate it into a reward function. Note that this instruction is not telling the agent to *actually* return to the start state, it merely says that it should maintain the *ability* to do so. This illustrates the motivation behind modal tasks; they let us reward the agent based on what is *possible* or *impossible* along its trajectory, rather than just in terms of what in fact occurs along that trajectory. Given this background motivation, we can now give a formal definition of modal tasks:

Definition 7. *Given a set of states $\mathcal{S}$ and a set of actions $\mathcal{A}$, a **modal reward function** $R^\Diamond$ is a function $R^\Diamond : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \times (\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \to \Delta(\mathcal{S})) \to \mathbb{R}$ which takes a state $s \in \mathcal{S}$, an action $a \in \mathcal{A}$, and a transition function τ over $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{A}$, and returns a real number.*

$R^\Diamond(s, a, \tau)$ is the reward that is obtained when taking action a in state s in an environment whose transition function is τ. Here we allow $R^\Diamond$ an unrestricted dependence on τ, to make our results as general as possible, even if a practical algorithm for solving modal tasks presumably would require restrictions on what this dependence can look like (see Appendix D). Modal reward functions can be used to express instructions such as that we gave above. For example, a simple case might be "you get 1 reward if you reach this goal state, and -1 reward if you ever enter a state

from which you cannot reach the initial state". This reward depends on the transition function, because the transition function determines from which states you can reach the initial state. As usual, $R^\Diamond$ then induces a Q-function $Q^\Diamond$, value function $V^\Diamond$, and evaluation function $J^\Diamond$, etc. We say that a modal reward $R^\Diamond$ and an ordinary reward R are *contingently equivalent* given a transition function τ if $J^\Diamond$ and J induce the same ordering of policies given τ, and that they are *robustly equivalent* if $J^\Diamond$ and J induce the same ordering of policies for all τ. We use $R_\tau^\Diamond$ to denote the reward function $R_\tau^\Diamond(s, a) = R^\Diamond(s, a, \tau)$. We will also use the following definition.

Definition 8. *A modal reward function $R^\Diamond$ is **vacuous** if there is a reward function R such that for all τ, R and $R_\tau^\Diamond$ have the same policy ordering under τ.*

The intuition here is that a vacuous modal reward function does not actually depend on τ in any important sense. Note that this is *not* necessarily to say that $R_\tau^\Diamond = R$ for all τ. For example, it could be the case that $R_\tau^\Diamond$ is a *scaled* version of R, or that $R_\tau^\Diamond$ and R differ by *potential shaping* Ng et al. [1999], or that $R_\tau^\Diamond$ is modified in a way such that $\mathbb{E}_{S' \sim \tau(s,a)}[R_\tau^\Diamond(s, a, S')] = \mathbb{E}_{S' \sim \tau(s,a)}[R(s, a, S')]$, since none of these differences affect the policy ordering (for a more in-depth examination, see Skalse et al. [2022a]). From this, we get the following straightforward result:

Theorem 3. *For any modal reward $R^\Diamond$ and any transition function τ, there exists a reward R that is contingently equivalent to $R^\Diamond$ given τ. Moreover, unless $R^\Diamond$ is vacuous, there is no reward that is robustly equivalent to $R^\Diamond$.*

In other words, *every* modal task can be expressed with an ordinary reward function in each particular given environment, but *no* reward function expresses a (non-vacuous) modal task in all environments. Is this enough? We argue that it is not, because the construction of $R_\tau^\Diamond$ will invariably be laborious, and require detailed knowledge of the environment. For example, consider the task "you should always be able to return to the start state"; here, constructing $R_\tau^\Diamond$ would amount to manually enumerating all the states from which the start state is reachable: this would be very much against the spirit of RL, where much of the point is that we want to be able to specify tasks which can be pursued in *unknown* environments. In short, a method which requires a model of the environment is arguably not an RL method. We thus argue that reward functions are largely unable to capture modal tasks in a satisfactory way.

One remaining question might be why one would want to express tasks for RL agents in terms of modal properties. After all, what benefit is there to the instruction "never enter a state from which it is possible to quickly enter an unsafe state" over the instruction "never enter an unsafe state"? One reason is that the former task might lead to behaviour that is more robust to changes in the environment. For example,

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[1]To avoid a possible confusion, we should emphasise that we here use the term "modal" in a somewhat more narrow sense than the sense of "modal logic". In particular, we use it to mean "pertaining to what is possible or impossible", as in e.g. Kment [2021]. In that sense, Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) does not express modal statements, even though it is a modal logic, because LTL can only make assertions about what in fact occurs. For that reason, not everything that relates to modal logic will be related to the setting we discuss here. The type of possibility we discuss is specifically "possibility according to the transition function".

if an RL agent is trained in a simulated environment, and deployed in the real world, then it seems like it would be preferable to tell the agent to avoid *risky* states, rather than *unsafe* states, since imperfections in the simulation could lead to an underestimation of the risk involved. Another example is the existing work on avoiding side effects (e.g. [Krakovna et al., 2018, 2020, Turner et al., 2020, Griffin et al., 2022]), which it is natural to express in modal terms. This work can be viewed as being aimed at making the behaviour of an RL agent more robust to misspecification of the reward function.

6 SOLVING TASKS THAT ARE INEXPRESSIBLE BY MARKOVIAN REWARDS

We have pointed to three broad classes tasks that cannot be expressed using scalar, Markovian reward functions, namely multi-objective, risk-sensitive, and modal tasks. A natural next question is whether these tasks *can* be solved at all using RL, or whether only tasks corresponding to Markovian reward functions can be effectively learnt. We briefly discuss this issue below. In short, it is indeed possible to design RL algorithms for tasks in each of these categories.

First of all, the existing literature already contains several bespoke RL algorithms that solve some of the problems that we have discussed. Multi-objective reinforcement learning is particularly well-explored, with many existing algorithms. Most of these algorithms are designed to solve a specific MORL objective; for example, Skalse et al. [2022b] solve the **LexMax** objective, and Tessler et al. [2019] solve the **ConSat** objective. Similarly, there are existing algorithms for risk-sensitive RL (e.g. Chow et al. [2017]), and even algorithms that solve certain modal tasks [Krakovna et al., 2018, 2020, Turner et al., 2020, Wang et al., 2020, Griffin et al., 2022]. We give a more complete overview of this existing work in Section 7.1.

It should also be possible to design algorithms that can flexibly solve many different tasks from the classes we have discussed, instead of having to be designed for just one particular task. For example, suppose a MORL objective can be represented by a function $U : \mathbb{R}^k \to \mathbb{R}$, such that $\pi_1 \prec \pi_2$ when $U(J_1(\pi_1) \ldots J_k(\pi_1)) < U(J_1(\pi_2) \ldots J_k(\pi_2))$, and that U is *differentiable*. We give a few examples of such objectives in Appendix C, including e.g. a "soft" version of **MaxMin**. With such an objective, if we have a policy π that is differentiable with respect to some parameters θ, then one could compute the gradient of $U(J_1(\pi) \ldots J_k(\pi))$ with respect to θ, and then use a policy gradient method to increase U. This means that it should be possible to design an actor-critic algorithm that can solve any differentiable MORL objective. We consider the development of such methods to be a promising direction for further work.

In Appendix D, we also outline a possible approach for solving a wide class of modal tasks. Further exploration of this setting would also be interesting for further work.

7 DISCUSSION

In this paper, we have studied the ability of Markovian reward functions to express different kinds of problems. We have looked at three classes of tasks; multi-objective tasks, risk-sensitive tasks, and modal tasks, and found that Markovian reward functions are unable to express most of the tasks in each of these three classes. In particular, have provided necessary and sufficient conditions for when a single-policy MORL problem can be expressed using a scalar, Markovian reward function, and demonstrated that this only can be done when the MORL objective corresponds to a linear weighting of the individual rewards. Moreover, we have also provided necessary and sufficient conditions for when a monotonic transformation of the return function, G, can be expressed as a Markovian reward function, and demonstrated that this only can be done for affine transformations. Furthermore, we have also also drawn attention to a class of tasks which have just barely been explored previously (namely modal tasks), and shown that most of these tasks cannot be expressed using Markovian reward functions. Finally, we have shown that many of these problems still can be solved with RL, and even outlined some methods for doing this.

Our work has a number of immediate practical implications. First of all, we have contributed to a more precise demarcation of what types of problems can be expressed within the most common RL formalism. This makes it easier to determine whether standard RL techniques are applicable to a given problem, or whether more specialised methods must be used. In particular, our results show that there are situations in which careful reward specification and reward shaping will not be sufficient to robustly incentivise the desired behaviour. In those cases, we must instead use an alternative policy synthesis method, such as e.g. those offered by MORL. Secondly, in the area of reward learning, most algorithms attempt to fit a scalar, Markovian reward function to their training data [e.g. Christiano et al., 2023]. Our work clarifies the implicit modelling assumptions behind these algorithms, and shows that there are many situations in which these models will be misspecified.

Our work also suggests several directions for further work. The fact that the common settings of MORL and risk-sensitive RL indeed are genuine extensions over the standard (scalar, Markovian) setting provides additional motivation for further work in these areas. Our work also suggests that it could be interesting to further explore the modal setting, or other directions that aim to extend the expressivity of the standard RL setting. We give an overview of the existing work in this area in Section 7.1. Our work also motivates work on reward learning algorithms which do not assume

that the preferences of the demonstrator can be captured by a scalar, Markovian reward. There is some existing work in this area [e.g. Abate et al., 2022], but it remains quite limited. Moreover, another interesting direction for further work would be to quantify the consequences of taking a task which cannot be perfectly represented using a Markovian reward function, and trying to approximate it using a Markovian reward function. For example, could we bound the worst-case regret that might be incurred if a MORL problem is approximated using a scalar reward? Finally, another interesting direction for further work would be to more thoroughly explore the expressivity of other types of problem settings, and their relationship to each other.

7.1 RELATED WORK

There has been a lot of recent work on the expressivity of Markovian reward functions. Here, we summarise relevant contributions, and detail differences with our work.

Notably, there are three recent papers which provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when a particular type of task can be expressed using a particular type of reward function. The first of these is Pitis [2019], who consider a task to be a preference relation defined over *prospects*, where a prospect is defined as a pair of a state and a policy. Moreover, they generalise the discount function by allowing it to depend on the transition (instead of always being a constant value γ). They then add two axioms (and one assumption) to the famous vNM-axioms (from von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947]), to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for when a task (as they formalise it) can be expressed as a Markovian reward with transition-dependent discounting. Our work differs from their in several ways, as explained shortly.

The next paper is Shakerinava and Ravanbakhsh [2022], who provide an alternative, simpler axiomatisation of the setting considered by Pitis [2019], and also provide further axioms to describe two additional types of environments. They consider environments without any discount factor, but instead use termination probabilities, which can be used to simulate the standard case with exponential discounting.

The third paper is Bowling et al. [2022], who generalise the results of Shakerinava and Ravanbakhsh [2022] even further, and provide an alternative axiom to add to the vNM axioms. They start by considering preference relations over finite trajectories, and then extend this to a preference relation over policies by saying that a policy π_1 is preferred to π_2 if there exists a time t after which the trajectory distribution induced by π_1 is always preferable to the trajectory distribution induced by π_2. This encompasses the setting with exponentially discounted reward, the setting with limit-average reward, and the episodic setting. They consider both the case where the discount function is transition-dependent, and the case when it is constant.

Our work differs from that by Pitis [2019], Shakerinava and Ravanbakhsh [2022], Bowling et al. [2022] in a few ways. First of all, these papers aim to establish general necessary and sufficient conditions for when a task can be formalised as a Markovian reward, whereas we instead focus on three specific classes of tasks that we believe to be especially interesting. It might in principle be possible to derive our results as a special case of theirs. However, doing this would be quite non-trivial, and possibly more difficult than our direct derivations. Secondly, the axiomatisations provided by Pitis [2019], Shakerinava and Ravanbakhsh [2022], Bowling et al. [2022] are difficult to use in practice. Our results, on the other hand, are arguably intuitive to understand, and concern some settings that are both popular and important. Our work could thus be construed as a study on the practical consequences of the work by Pitis [2019], Shakerinava and Ravanbakhsh [2022], Bowling et al. [2022], with results that may be more directly useful to practitioners. There are also several differences in how we formalise the problem compared to Pitis [2019], Shakerinava and Ravanbakhsh [2022], Bowling et al. [2022]. For example, we consider the case with fixed discount rates, whereas Pitis [2019] and Bowling et al. [2022] consider transition-dependent discount rates. To give another example, Shakerinava and Ravanbakhsh [2022] consider finite trajectories, whereas we consider infinite trajectories (noting that the latter can model the former, but not vice versa). These differences further contribute to distinguishing our results from theirs.

Another notable piece of related work is Abel et al. [2021], who point to three different ways to formalise the notion of a "task" (namely, as a set of acceptable policies, as an ordering over policies, or as an ordering over trajectories). They then demonstrate that each of these classes contains at least one instance which cannot be expressed using a Markovian reward function, and provide algorithms which compute reward functions for these types of tasks. Our work is different from theirs in a few different ways. First of all, we consider three different ways to specify a policy ordering, and then derive necessary and sufficient conditions which can be used to directly determine when the resulting policy ordering can be expressed as a Markovian reward function. Abel et al. [2021] do not provide necessary and sufficient conditions, but instead only provide a counter-example for each type of task, showing that Markovian rewards cannot formalise all tasks of that type.

Another important paper is the work by Vamplew et al. [2022], who argue that there are many important aspects of intelligence which can be captured by MORL, but not by scalar RL. Like them, we also argue that MORL is a genuine extension of scalar RL, but our approach is quite different. They focus on the question of whether MORL or (scalar) RL is a better foundation for the development of general intelligence (considering feasibility, safety, and

etc), and they provide qualitative arguments and biological evidence. By contrast, we are more narrowly focused on what incentive structures can be expressed by MORL and scalar RL, and our results are mathematical.

Miura [2022] considers the question of when a task can be expressed as a constrained MDP (CMDP), or as a Markovian reward. They formalise a task as two sets of policies, $\langle \Pi_G, \Pi_B \rangle$, and consider a CMDP to express the task if all policies in Π_G, and none of the policies in Π_B, are feasible, and consider a Markovian reward to express the task if all policies in Π_G, and none of the policies in Π_B, are optimal under that reward. They then derive necessary and sufficient conditions for both of these cases, and show that CMDPs are strictly more expressive than Markovian rewards for these types of tasks. The CMDP framework is a special case of the MORL framework we discuss in Section 3, roughly corresponding to the **MaxSat** objective. On the other hand, we formalise the notion of a task as a policy ordering, whereas Miura [2022] formalises it as a set of feasible policies.

Also relevant is the work by Pitis et al. [2022], who consider a task to consist of multiple Markovian reward functions, each of which may use a different discount parameter, and where the goal is to maximise the sum of these rewards. They then show that this setting may lead to the optimal policy being non-stationary, which demonstrates that it cannot always be expressed using Markovian rewards. Our analysis of the MORL setting allows for more general objectives than the case where the goal is to maximise the sum of the individual rewards. On the other hand, we assume that the same discount parameter is used for each reward. Our analysis is therefore in some ways more general, and in other ways more restrictive, than that of Pitis et al. [2022].

Also related is the work by Skalse et al. [2022c], who demonstrate that if for two rewards R_1, R_2 there are no policies π_1, π_2 such that $J_1(\pi_1) < J_2(\pi_2)$ and $J_2(\pi_1) > J_2(\pi_2)$, then either R_1 and R_2 are equivalent, or one of them is trivial. This means that there are some policy orderings that cannot be expressed using Markovian rewards. We consider different kinds of policy orderings than they do.

There is also other relevant work that is less strongly related. For example, Icarte et al. [2022] point out that there are certain tasks which cannot be expressed using Markovian rewards, and propose a way extend their expressivity by augmenting the reward function with an automaton that they call a *reward machine*. Similar approaches have also been used by Hasanbeig et al. [2020], Hammond et al. [2021], tackling infinite-horizon tasks for single- and multi-agent systems. There are also other ways to extend Markovian rewards to a more general setting, such as *convex RL*, as studied by e.g. Hazan et al. [2019], Zhang et al. [2020], Zahavy et al. [2021], Geist et al. [2022], Mutti et al. [2022], and *vectorial RL*, as studied by e.g. Cheung [2019a,b]. Analysing the expressivity of these problem settings more extensively would

be an interesting direction for further work.

There is a large literature on (the overlapping topics of) single-policy MORL, constrained RL, and risk-sensitive RL. These areas are too large for it to be possible to give a fully complete overview of this work here. Some notable examples include Achiam et al. [2017], Chow et al. [2017], Miryoosefi et al. [2019], Tessler et al. [2019], Skalse et al. [2022b]. This existing literature typically focuses on the creation of algorithms for solving particular MORL problems, rather than on characterising when MORL problems can (or cannot) be reduced to scalar RL. Modal RL has (to the best of our knowledge) never been discussed explicitly in the literature before. However, it relates to some existing work, such as side-effect avoidance [Krakovna et al., 2018, 2020, Turner et al., 2020, Griffin et al., 2022], and the work by Wang et al. [2020].

Finally, our work also relates to existing work in decision theory, social choice theory, and related fields. This of course includes the famous work by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947]. As discussed previously, the work by Harsanyi [1955] is also particularly relevant. Note that work in decision theory and social choice theory typically only considers single-step decision problems, whereas the RL setting of course considers sequential decision making. There are also a few other modelling assumptions that are common in decision theory and social choice theory which do not hold in the RL setting. For example, in these fields, it is common to assume that the choice set is finite (whereas the set of trajectories in RL may be infinite), that preferences are defined over all distributions over the choice set (whereas it in RL is more common to only consider distributions that can be realised by some policy for a given transition function), and that a utility function can be any function from the choice set to real numbers (whereas many of these functions cannot be expressed as reward functions). Consequently, results from decision theory and social choice theory only sometimes generalise to the RL setting. For example, in Section 3, we provide some examples of results that do generalise to the RL setting, and in Section 4, we provide some examples of results which do not generalise.

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