Rational Beliefs Real Agents Can Have – A Logical Point of View

Marcello D’Agostino, Tommaso Flaminio, Hykel Hosni
Proceedings of the NIPS 2016 Workshop on Imperfect Decision Makers, PMLR 58:97-109, 2017.

Abstract

The purpose of this note is to outline a framework for uncertain reasoning which drops unrealistic assumptions about the agents’ inferential capabilities. To do so, we envisage a pivotal role for the recent research programme of \emphdepth-bounded Boolean logics. We suggest that this can be fruitfully extended to the representation of rational belief under uncertainty. By doing this we lay the foundations for a prescriptive account of rational belief, namely one that \emphrealistic agents, as opposed to idealised ones, can feasibly act upon.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v58-d-agostino17a, title = {Rational Beliefs Real Agents Can Have – {A} Logical Point of View}, author = {D’Agostino, Marcello and Flaminio, Tommaso and Hosni, Hykel}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the NIPS 2016 Workshop on Imperfect Decision Makers}, pages = {97--109}, year = {2017}, editor = {Guy, Tatiana V. and Kárný, Miroslav and Rios-Insua, David and Wolpert, David H.}, volume = {58}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {09 Dec}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {http://proceedings.mlr.press/v58/d-agostino17a/d-agostino17a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v58/d-agostino17a.html}, abstract = {The purpose of this note is to outline a framework for uncertain reasoning which drops unrealistic assumptions about the agents’ inferential capabilities. To do so, we envisage a pivotal role for the recent research programme of \emphdepth-bounded Boolean logics. We suggest that this can be fruitfully extended to the representation of rational belief under uncertainty. By doing this we lay the foundations for a prescriptive account of rational belief, namely one that \emphrealistic agents, as opposed to idealised ones, can feasibly act upon.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Rational Beliefs Real Agents Can Have – A Logical Point of View %A Marcello D’Agostino %A Tommaso Flaminio %A Hykel Hosni %B Proceedings of the NIPS 2016 Workshop on Imperfect Decision Makers %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2017 %E Tatiana V. Guy %E Miroslav Kárný %E David Rios-Insua %E David H. Wolpert %F pmlr-v58-d-agostino17a %I PMLR %P 97--109 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v58/d-agostino17a.html %V 58 %X The purpose of this note is to outline a framework for uncertain reasoning which drops unrealistic assumptions about the agents’ inferential capabilities. To do so, we envisage a pivotal role for the recent research programme of \emphdepth-bounded Boolean logics. We suggest that this can be fruitfully extended to the representation of rational belief under uncertainty. By doing this we lay the foundations for a prescriptive account of rational belief, namely one that \emphrealistic agents, as opposed to idealised ones, can feasibly act upon.
APA
D’Agostino, M., Flaminio, T. & Hosni, H.. (2017). Rational Beliefs Real Agents Can Have – A Logical Point of View. Proceedings of the NIPS 2016 Workshop on Imperfect Decision Makers, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 58:97-109 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v58/d-agostino17a.html.

Related Material