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Experimental Performance of Deliberation-Aware Responder in Multi-Proposer Ultimatum Game
Proceedings of the NIPS 2016 Workshop on Imperfect Decision Makers, PMLR 58:51-60, 2017.
Abstract
The ultimatum game serves for studying various aspects of decision making
(DM). Recently, its multi-proposer version has been modified to study the influence
of deliberation costs. An optimising policy of the responder, switching between several
proposers at non-negligible deliberation costs, was designed and successfully tested
in a simulated environment. The policy design was done within the framework of
Markov Decision Processes with rewards also allowing to model the responder’s feeling
for fairness. It relies on simple Markov models of proposers, which are recursively
learnt in a Bayesian way during the game course. This paper verifies, whether the
gained theoretically plausible policy, suits to real-life DM. It describes experiments
in which this policy was applied against human proposers. The results – with eleven
groups of three independently acting proposers – confirm the soundness of this policy.
It increases the responder’s economic profit due to switching between proposers, in spite
of the deliberation costs and the used approximate modelling of proposers. Methodologically,
it opens the possibility to learn systematically willingness of humans to spent their
deliberation resources on specific DM tasks.