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Non-parametric Revenue Optimization for Generalized Second Price auctions.
Proceedings of the 31st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, PMLR R13:712-721, 2015.
Abstract
We present an extensive analysis of the key prob- lem of learning optimal reserve prices for gen- eralized second price auctions. We describe two algorithms for this task: one based on den- sity estimation, and a novel algorithm benefit- ting from solid theoretical guarantees and with a very favorable running-time complexity of O(nS log(nS)), where n is the sample size and S the number of slots. Our theoretical guar- antees are more favorable than those previously presented in the literature. Additionally, we show that even if bidders do not play at an equilibrium, our second algorithm is still well defined and minimizes a quantity of interest. To our knowl- edge, this is the first attempt to apply learning algorithms to the problem of reserve price optimization in GSP auctions.