Solving Cooperative Reliability Games

Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, PMLR R9:44-51, 2011.

Abstract

Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a certain probability, and a coalition’s value is the probability that its surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types. We also show that applying the reliability extension may stabilize the game, making the core non-empty even when the base game has an empty core.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-vR9-bachrach11a, title = {Solving Cooperative Reliability Games}, author = {Bachrach, Yoram and Meir, Reshef and Feldman, Michal and Tennenholtz, Moshe}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence}, pages = {44--51}, year = {2011}, editor = {Cozman, Fabio and Pfeffer, Avi}, volume = {R9}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {14--17 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/r9/main/assets/bachrach11a/bachrach11a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/r9/bachrach11a.html}, abstract = {Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a certain probability, and a coalition’s value is the probability that its surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types. We also show that applying the reliability extension may stabilize the game, making the core non-empty even when the base game has an empty core.}, note = {Reissued by PMLR on 04 October 2026.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Solving Cooperative Reliability Games %A Yoram Bachrach %A Reshef Meir %A Michal Feldman %A Moshe Tennenholtz %B Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2011 %E Fabio Cozman %E Avi Pfeffer %F pmlr-vR9-bachrach11a %I PMLR %P 44--51 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/r9/bachrach11a.html %V R9 %X Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a certain probability, and a coalition’s value is the probability that its surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types. We also show that applying the reliability extension may stabilize the game, making the core non-empty even when the base game has an empty core. %Z Reissued by PMLR on 04 October 2026.
APA
Bachrach, Y., Meir, R., Feldman, M. & Tennenholtz, M.. (2011). Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research R9:44-51 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/r9/bachrach11a.html. Reissued by PMLR on 04 October 2026.

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