No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions

Wenshuo Guo, Michael Jordan, Ellen Vitercik
Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 162:8039-8055, 2022.

Abstract

Auctions with partially-revealed information about items are broadly employed in real-world applications, but the underlying mechanisms have limited theoretical support. In this work, we study a machine learning formulation of these types of mechanisms, presenting algorithms that are no-regret from the buyer’s perspective. Specifically, a buyer who wishes to maximize his utility interacts repeatedly with a platform over a series of $T$ rounds. In each round, a new item is drawn from an unknown distribution and the platform publishes a price together with incomplete, “masked” information about the item. The buyer then decides whether to purchase the item. We formalize this problem as an online learning task where the goal is to have low regret with respect to a myopic oracle that has perfect knowledge of the distribution over items and the seller’s masking function. When the distribution over items is known to the buyer and the mask is a SimHash function mapping $\R^d$ to $\{0,1\}^{\ell}$, our algorithm has regret $\tilde \cO((Td\ell)^{\nicefrac{1}{2}})$. In a fully agnostic setting when the mask is an arbitrary function mapping to a set of size $n$ and the prices are stochastic, our algorithm has regret $\tilde \cO((Tn)^{\nicefrac{1}{2}})$.

Cite this Paper


BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v162-guo22b, title = {No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions}, author = {Guo, Wenshuo and Jordan, Michael and Vitercik, Ellen}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {8039--8055}, year = {2022}, editor = {Chaudhuri, Kamalika and Jegelka, Stefanie and Song, Le and Szepesvari, Csaba and Niu, Gang and Sabato, Sivan}, volume = {162}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {17--23 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/guo22b/guo22b.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/guo22b.html}, abstract = {Auctions with partially-revealed information about items are broadly employed in real-world applications, but the underlying mechanisms have limited theoretical support. In this work, we study a machine learning formulation of these types of mechanisms, presenting algorithms that are no-regret from the buyer’s perspective. Specifically, a buyer who wishes to maximize his utility interacts repeatedly with a platform over a series of $T$ rounds. In each round, a new item is drawn from an unknown distribution and the platform publishes a price together with incomplete, “masked” information about the item. The buyer then decides whether to purchase the item. We formalize this problem as an online learning task where the goal is to have low regret with respect to a myopic oracle that has perfect knowledge of the distribution over items and the seller’s masking function. When the distribution over items is known to the buyer and the mask is a SimHash function mapping $\R^d$ to $\{0,1\}^{\ell}$, our algorithm has regret $\tilde \cO((Td\ell)^{\nicefrac{1}{2}})$. In a fully agnostic setting when the mask is an arbitrary function mapping to a set of size $n$ and the prices are stochastic, our algorithm has regret $\tilde \cO((Tn)^{\nicefrac{1}{2}})$.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions %A Wenshuo Guo %A Michael Jordan %A Ellen Vitercik %B Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2022 %E Kamalika Chaudhuri %E Stefanie Jegelka %E Le Song %E Csaba Szepesvari %E Gang Niu %E Sivan Sabato %F pmlr-v162-guo22b %I PMLR %P 8039--8055 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/guo22b.html %V 162 %X Auctions with partially-revealed information about items are broadly employed in real-world applications, but the underlying mechanisms have limited theoretical support. In this work, we study a machine learning formulation of these types of mechanisms, presenting algorithms that are no-regret from the buyer’s perspective. Specifically, a buyer who wishes to maximize his utility interacts repeatedly with a platform over a series of $T$ rounds. In each round, a new item is drawn from an unknown distribution and the platform publishes a price together with incomplete, “masked” information about the item. The buyer then decides whether to purchase the item. We formalize this problem as an online learning task where the goal is to have low regret with respect to a myopic oracle that has perfect knowledge of the distribution over items and the seller’s masking function. When the distribution over items is known to the buyer and the mask is a SimHash function mapping $\R^d$ to $\{0,1\}^{\ell}$, our algorithm has regret $\tilde \cO((Td\ell)^{\nicefrac{1}{2}})$. In a fully agnostic setting when the mask is an arbitrary function mapping to a set of size $n$ and the prices are stochastic, our algorithm has regret $\tilde \cO((Tn)^{\nicefrac{1}{2}})$.
APA
Guo, W., Jordan, M. & Vitercik, E.. (2022). No-Regret Learning in Partially-Informed Auctions. Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 162:8039-8055 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/guo22b.html.

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