Multi-Agent Learning from Learners

Mine Melodi Caliskan, Francesco Chini, Setareh Maghsudi
Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 202:3525-3540, 2023.

Abstract

A large body of the "Inverse Reinforcement Learning" (IRL) literature focuses on recovering the reward function from a set of demonstrations of an expert agent who acts optimally or noisily optimally. Nevertheless, some recent works move away from the optimality assumption to study the "Learning from a Learner (LfL)" problem, where the challenge is inferring the reward function of a learning agent from a sequence of demonstrations produced by progressively improving policies. In this work, we take one of the initial steps in addressing the multi-agent version of this problem and propose a new algorithm, MA-LfL (Multiagent Learning from a Learner). Unlike the state-of-the-art literature, which recovers the reward functions from trajectories produced by agents in some equilibrium, we study the problem of inferring the reward functions of interacting agents in a general sum stochastic game without assuming any equilibrium state. The MA-LfL algorithm is rigorously built on a theoretical result that ensures its validity in the case of agents learning according to a multi-agent soft policy iteration scheme. We empirically test MA-LfL and we observe high positive correlation between the recovered reward functions and the ground truth.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v202-caliskan23a, title = {Multi-Agent Learning from Learners}, author = {Caliskan, Mine Melodi and Chini, Francesco and Maghsudi, Setareh}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {3525--3540}, year = {2023}, editor = {Krause, Andreas and Brunskill, Emma and Cho, Kyunghyun and Engelhardt, Barbara and Sabato, Sivan and Scarlett, Jonathan}, volume = {202}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {23--29 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/caliskan23a/caliskan23a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/caliskan23a.html}, abstract = {A large body of the "Inverse Reinforcement Learning" (IRL) literature focuses on recovering the reward function from a set of demonstrations of an expert agent who acts optimally or noisily optimally. Nevertheless, some recent works move away from the optimality assumption to study the "Learning from a Learner (LfL)" problem, where the challenge is inferring the reward function of a learning agent from a sequence of demonstrations produced by progressively improving policies. In this work, we take one of the initial steps in addressing the multi-agent version of this problem and propose a new algorithm, MA-LfL (Multiagent Learning from a Learner). Unlike the state-of-the-art literature, which recovers the reward functions from trajectories produced by agents in some equilibrium, we study the problem of inferring the reward functions of interacting agents in a general sum stochastic game without assuming any equilibrium state. The MA-LfL algorithm is rigorously built on a theoretical result that ensures its validity in the case of agents learning according to a multi-agent soft policy iteration scheme. We empirically test MA-LfL and we observe high positive correlation between the recovered reward functions and the ground truth.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Multi-Agent Learning from Learners %A Mine Melodi Caliskan %A Francesco Chini %A Setareh Maghsudi %B Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2023 %E Andreas Krause %E Emma Brunskill %E Kyunghyun Cho %E Barbara Engelhardt %E Sivan Sabato %E Jonathan Scarlett %F pmlr-v202-caliskan23a %I PMLR %P 3525--3540 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/caliskan23a.html %V 202 %X A large body of the "Inverse Reinforcement Learning" (IRL) literature focuses on recovering the reward function from a set of demonstrations of an expert agent who acts optimally or noisily optimally. Nevertheless, some recent works move away from the optimality assumption to study the "Learning from a Learner (LfL)" problem, where the challenge is inferring the reward function of a learning agent from a sequence of demonstrations produced by progressively improving policies. In this work, we take one of the initial steps in addressing the multi-agent version of this problem and propose a new algorithm, MA-LfL (Multiagent Learning from a Learner). Unlike the state-of-the-art literature, which recovers the reward functions from trajectories produced by agents in some equilibrium, we study the problem of inferring the reward functions of interacting agents in a general sum stochastic game without assuming any equilibrium state. The MA-LfL algorithm is rigorously built on a theoretical result that ensures its validity in the case of agents learning according to a multi-agent soft policy iteration scheme. We empirically test MA-LfL and we observe high positive correlation between the recovered reward functions and the ground truth.
APA
Caliskan, M.M., Chini, F. & Maghsudi, S.. (2023). Multi-Agent Learning from Learners. Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 202:3525-3540 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/caliskan23a.html.

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