Policy Mirror Ascent for Efficient and Independent Learning in Mean Field Games

Batuhan Yardim, Semih Cayci, Matthieu Geist, Niao He
Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 202:39722-39754, 2023.

Abstract

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a “population generative model”, which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the $N$-player game. Instead, we show that $N$ agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\varepsilon^{-2})$ samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$ error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for $N$-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the $N$-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by $N$ agents with finite sample guarantees.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v202-yardim23a, title = {Policy Mirror Ascent for Efficient and Independent Learning in Mean Field Games}, author = {Yardim, Batuhan and Cayci, Semih and Geist, Matthieu and He, Niao}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {39722--39754}, year = {2023}, editor = {Krause, Andreas and Brunskill, Emma and Cho, Kyunghyun and Engelhardt, Barbara and Sabato, Sivan and Scarlett, Jonathan}, volume = {202}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {23--29 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/yardim23a/yardim23a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/yardim23a.html}, abstract = {Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a “population generative model”, which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the $N$-player game. Instead, we show that $N$ agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\varepsilon^{-2})$ samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$ error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for $N$-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the $N$-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by $N$ agents with finite sample guarantees.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Policy Mirror Ascent for Efficient and Independent Learning in Mean Field Games %A Batuhan Yardim %A Semih Cayci %A Matthieu Geist %A Niao He %B Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2023 %E Andreas Krause %E Emma Brunskill %E Kyunghyun Cho %E Barbara Engelhardt %E Sivan Sabato %E Jonathan Scarlett %F pmlr-v202-yardim23a %I PMLR %P 39722--39754 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/yardim23a.html %V 202 %X Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a “population generative model”, which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the $N$-player game. Instead, we show that $N$ agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\varepsilon^{-2})$ samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$ error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for $N$-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the $N$-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by $N$ agents with finite sample guarantees.
APA
Yardim, B., Cayci, S., Geist, M. & He, N.. (2023). Policy Mirror Ascent for Efficient and Independent Learning in Mean Field Games. Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 202:39722-39754 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/yardim23a.html.

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