Two-phase Attacks in Security Games

Andrzej Nagorko, Pawel Ciosmak, Tomasz Michalak
Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, PMLR 216:1489-1498, 2023.

Abstract

A standard model of a security game assumes a one-off assault during which the attacker cannot update their strategy even if new actionable insights are gained in the process. In this paper, we propose a version of a security game that takes into account a possibility of a two-phase attack. Specifically, in the first phase, the attacker makes a preliminary move to gain extra information about this particular instance of the game. Based on this information, the attacker chooses an optimal concluding move. We derive a compact-form mixed-integer linear program that computes an optimal strategy of the defender. Our simulation shows that this strategy mitigates serious losses incurred to the defender by a two-phase attack while still protecting well against less sophisticated attackers.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v216-nagorko23a, title = {Two-phase Attacks in Security Games}, author = {Nagorko, Andrzej and Ciosmak, Pawel and Michalak, Tomasz}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence}, pages = {1489--1498}, year = {2023}, editor = {Evans, Robin J. and Shpitser, Ilya}, volume = {216}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {31 Jul--04 Aug}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v216/nagorko23a/nagorko23a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v216/nagorko23a.html}, abstract = {A standard model of a security game assumes a one-off assault during which the attacker cannot update their strategy even if new actionable insights are gained in the process. In this paper, we propose a version of a security game that takes into account a possibility of a two-phase attack. Specifically, in the first phase, the attacker makes a preliminary move to gain extra information about this particular instance of the game. Based on this information, the attacker chooses an optimal concluding move. We derive a compact-form mixed-integer linear program that computes an optimal strategy of the defender. Our simulation shows that this strategy mitigates serious losses incurred to the defender by a two-phase attack while still protecting well against less sophisticated attackers.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Two-phase Attacks in Security Games %A Andrzej Nagorko %A Pawel Ciosmak %A Tomasz Michalak %B Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2023 %E Robin J. Evans %E Ilya Shpitser %F pmlr-v216-nagorko23a %I PMLR %P 1489--1498 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v216/nagorko23a.html %V 216 %X A standard model of a security game assumes a one-off assault during which the attacker cannot update their strategy even if new actionable insights are gained in the process. In this paper, we propose a version of a security game that takes into account a possibility of a two-phase attack. Specifically, in the first phase, the attacker makes a preliminary move to gain extra information about this particular instance of the game. Based on this information, the attacker chooses an optimal concluding move. We derive a compact-form mixed-integer linear program that computes an optimal strategy of the defender. Our simulation shows that this strategy mitigates serious losses incurred to the defender by a two-phase attack while still protecting well against less sophisticated attackers.
APA
Nagorko, A., Ciosmak, P. & Michalak, T.. (2023). Two-phase Attacks in Security Games. Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 216:1489-1498 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v216/nagorko23a.html.

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