Decentralized Online Learning in General-Sum Stackelberg Games

Yaolong Yu, Haipeng Chen
Proceedings of the Fortieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, PMLR 244:4056-4077, 2024.

Abstract

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader’s reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader’s action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting – the follower can manipulate the leader’s reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader’s strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v244-yu24b, title = {Decentralized Online Learning in General-Sum Stackelberg Games}, author = {Yu, Yaolong and Chen, Haipeng}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fortieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence}, pages = {4056--4077}, year = {2024}, editor = {Kiyavash, Negar and Mooij, Joris M.}, volume = {244}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {15--19 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v244/main/assets/yu24b/yu24b.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v244/yu24b.html}, abstract = {We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader’s reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader’s action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting – the follower can manipulate the leader’s reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader’s strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Decentralized Online Learning in General-Sum Stackelberg Games %A Yaolong Yu %A Haipeng Chen %B Proceedings of the Fortieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2024 %E Negar Kiyavash %E Joris M. Mooij %F pmlr-v244-yu24b %I PMLR %P 4056--4077 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v244/yu24b.html %V 244 %X We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader’s reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader’s action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting – the follower can manipulate the leader’s reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader’s strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.
APA
Yu, Y. & Chen, H.. (2024). Decentralized Online Learning in General-Sum Stackelberg Games. Proceedings of the Fortieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 244:4056-4077 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v244/yu24b.html.

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