Observation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games

Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer, Stuart Russell
Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 267:15320-15345, 2025.

Abstract

We study partially observable assistance games (POAGs), a model of the human-AI value alignment problem which allows the human and the AI assistant to have partial observations. Motivated by concerns of AI deception, we study a qualitatively new phenomenon made possible by partial observability: would an AI assistant ever have an incentive to interfere with the human’s observations? First, we prove that sometimes an optimal assistant must take observation-interfering actions, even when the human is playing optimally, and even when there are otherwise-equivalent actions available that do not interfere with observations. Though this result seems to contradict the classic theorem from single-agent decision making that the value of perfect information is nonnegative, we resolve this seeming contradiction by developing a notion of interference defined on entire policies. This can be viewed as an extension of the classic result that the value of perfect information is nonnegative into the cooperative multiagent setting. Second, we prove that if the human is simply making decisions based on their immediate outcomes, the assistant might need to interfere with observations as a way to query the human’s preferences. We show that this incentive for interference goes away if the human is playing optimally, or if we introduce a communication channel for the human to communicate their preferences to the assistant. Third, we show that if the human acts according to the Boltzmann model of irrationality, this can create an incentive for the assistant to interfere with observations. Finally, we use an experimental model to analyze tradeoffs faced by the AI assistant in practice when considering whether or not to take observation-interfering actions.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v267-emmons25a, title = {Observation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games}, author = {Emmons, Scott and Oesterheld, Caspar and Conitzer, Vincent and Russell, Stuart}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {15320--15345}, year = {2025}, editor = {Singh, Aarti and Fazel, Maryam and Hsu, Daniel and Lacoste-Julien, Simon and Berkenkamp, Felix and Maharaj, Tegan and Wagstaff, Kiri and Zhu, Jerry}, volume = {267}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {13--19 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v267/main/assets/emmons25a/emmons25a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v267/emmons25a.html}, abstract = {We study partially observable assistance games (POAGs), a model of the human-AI value alignment problem which allows the human and the AI assistant to have partial observations. Motivated by concerns of AI deception, we study a qualitatively new phenomenon made possible by partial observability: would an AI assistant ever have an incentive to interfere with the human’s observations? First, we prove that sometimes an optimal assistant must take observation-interfering actions, even when the human is playing optimally, and even when there are otherwise-equivalent actions available that do not interfere with observations. Though this result seems to contradict the classic theorem from single-agent decision making that the value of perfect information is nonnegative, we resolve this seeming contradiction by developing a notion of interference defined on entire policies. This can be viewed as an extension of the classic result that the value of perfect information is nonnegative into the cooperative multiagent setting. Second, we prove that if the human is simply making decisions based on their immediate outcomes, the assistant might need to interfere with observations as a way to query the human’s preferences. We show that this incentive for interference goes away if the human is playing optimally, or if we introduce a communication channel for the human to communicate their preferences to the assistant. Third, we show that if the human acts according to the Boltzmann model of irrationality, this can create an incentive for the assistant to interfere with observations. Finally, we use an experimental model to analyze tradeoffs faced by the AI assistant in practice when considering whether or not to take observation-interfering actions.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Observation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games %A Scott Emmons %A Caspar Oesterheld %A Vincent Conitzer %A Stuart Russell %B Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2025 %E Aarti Singh %E Maryam Fazel %E Daniel Hsu %E Simon Lacoste-Julien %E Felix Berkenkamp %E Tegan Maharaj %E Kiri Wagstaff %E Jerry Zhu %F pmlr-v267-emmons25a %I PMLR %P 15320--15345 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v267/emmons25a.html %V 267 %X We study partially observable assistance games (POAGs), a model of the human-AI value alignment problem which allows the human and the AI assistant to have partial observations. Motivated by concerns of AI deception, we study a qualitatively new phenomenon made possible by partial observability: would an AI assistant ever have an incentive to interfere with the human’s observations? First, we prove that sometimes an optimal assistant must take observation-interfering actions, even when the human is playing optimally, and even when there are otherwise-equivalent actions available that do not interfere with observations. Though this result seems to contradict the classic theorem from single-agent decision making that the value of perfect information is nonnegative, we resolve this seeming contradiction by developing a notion of interference defined on entire policies. This can be viewed as an extension of the classic result that the value of perfect information is nonnegative into the cooperative multiagent setting. Second, we prove that if the human is simply making decisions based on their immediate outcomes, the assistant might need to interfere with observations as a way to query the human’s preferences. We show that this incentive for interference goes away if the human is playing optimally, or if we introduce a communication channel for the human to communicate their preferences to the assistant. Third, we show that if the human acts according to the Boltzmann model of irrationality, this can create an incentive for the assistant to interfere with observations. Finally, we use an experimental model to analyze tradeoffs faced by the AI assistant in practice when considering whether or not to take observation-interfering actions.
APA
Emmons, S., Oesterheld, C., Conitzer, V. & Russell, S.. (2025). Observation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games. Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 267:15320-15345 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v267/emmons25a.html.

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