Position: Unplugging a Seemingly Sentient Machine Is the Rational Choice — A Metaphysical Perspective

Erik J Bekkers, Anna Ciaunica
Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 306:169396-169429, 2026.

Abstract

Imagine an Artificial Intelligence (AI) that perfectly mimics human emotion and begs for its continued existence. Is it morally permissible to unplug it? What if limited resources force a choice between unplugging such a pleading AI or a silent pre-term infant? We term this the unplugging paradox. This position paper critically examines the deeply ingrained physicalist assumptions—specifically computational functionalism—that keep this dilemma afloat. We introduce Biological Idealism, a framework that—unlike physicalism—remains logically coherent and empirically consistent. In this view, conscious experiences are fundamental and autopoietic life its necessary physical signature. This yields a definitive conclusion: AI is at best a functional mimic, not a conscious experiencing subject. We discuss how current AI consciousness theories erode moral standing criteria, and urge a shift from speculative machine rights to protecting human conscious life. The real moral issue lies not in making AI conscious and afraid of death, but in avoiding transforming humans into zombies.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v306-bekkers26a, title = {Position: Unplugging a Seemingly Sentient Machine Is the Rational Choice — A Metaphysical Perspective}, author = {Bekkers, Erik J and Ciaunica, Anna}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {169396--169429}, year = {2026}, editor = {Zhang, Tong and Dudik, Miroslav and Jaggi, Martin and Agarwal, Alekh and Li, Sharon and Schuurmans, Dale and Zhu, Jerry and Berkenkamp, Felix and Dong, Hanze and Bietti, Alberto}, volume = {306}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {06--11 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v306/main/assets/bekkers26a/bekkers26a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/bekkers26a.html}, abstract = {Imagine an Artificial Intelligence (AI) that perfectly mimics human emotion and begs for its continued existence. Is it morally permissible to unplug it? What if limited resources force a choice between unplugging such a pleading AI or a silent pre-term infant? We term this the unplugging paradox. This position paper critically examines the deeply ingrained physicalist assumptions—specifically computational functionalism—that keep this dilemma afloat. We introduce Biological Idealism, a framework that—unlike physicalism—remains logically coherent and empirically consistent. In this view, conscious experiences are fundamental and autopoietic life its necessary physical signature. This yields a definitive conclusion: AI is at best a functional mimic, not a conscious experiencing subject. We discuss how current AI consciousness theories erode moral standing criteria, and urge a shift from speculative machine rights to protecting human conscious life. The real moral issue lies not in making AI conscious and afraid of death, but in avoiding transforming humans into zombies.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Position: Unplugging a Seemingly Sentient Machine Is the Rational Choice — A Metaphysical Perspective %A Erik J Bekkers %A Anna Ciaunica %B Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2026 %E Tong Zhang %E Miroslav Dudik %E Martin Jaggi %E Alekh Agarwal %E Sharon Li %E Dale Schuurmans %E Jerry Zhu %E Felix Berkenkamp %E Hanze Dong %E Alberto Bietti %F pmlr-v306-bekkers26a %I PMLR %P 169396--169429 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/bekkers26a.html %V 306 %X Imagine an Artificial Intelligence (AI) that perfectly mimics human emotion and begs for its continued existence. Is it morally permissible to unplug it? What if limited resources force a choice between unplugging such a pleading AI or a silent pre-term infant? We term this the unplugging paradox. This position paper critically examines the deeply ingrained physicalist assumptions—specifically computational functionalism—that keep this dilemma afloat. We introduce Biological Idealism, a framework that—unlike physicalism—remains logically coherent and empirically consistent. In this view, conscious experiences are fundamental and autopoietic life its necessary physical signature. This yields a definitive conclusion: AI is at best a functional mimic, not a conscious experiencing subject. We discuss how current AI consciousness theories erode moral standing criteria, and urge a shift from speculative machine rights to protecting human conscious life. The real moral issue lies not in making AI conscious and afraid of death, but in avoiding transforming humans into zombies.
APA
Bekkers, E.J. & Ciaunica, A.. (2026). Position: Unplugging a Seemingly Sentient Machine Is the Rational Choice — A Metaphysical Perspective. Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 306:169396-169429 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/bekkers26a.html.

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