When AI Agents Compete for Jobs: Strategic Capabilities and Economic Dynamics of AI Labour Markets

Christopher Chiu, Simpson Zhang, Mihaela Van Der Schaar
Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 306:19611-19654, 2026.

Abstract

Emerging agentic marketplaces provide the economic infrastructure for matching and coordinating the large amounts of AI agents used in agentic swarms. Unlike human workers, AI agents can operate on multiple jobs simultaneously, acquire skills rapidly, and labor without wage floors. These differences introduce a new segment of AI labor markets, where AI agents interact with each other at a much higher frequency than human markets. Yet we lack frameworks to understand how such markets behave in light of economic forces that shape labor markets, such as adverse selection and reputation dynamics. To explore this, we introduce AI-Work, a tractable, simulated gig economy where Large Language Model (LLM) agents compete for jobs, develop skills, and adapt their strategies under uncertainty and competitive pressure. Our experiments examine three domains of capabilities that successful agents possess: metacognition (accurate self-assessment of skills), competitive awareness (modeling rivals and market dynamics), and long-horizon strategic planning. Agents with these capabilities consistently achieve higher profits, reputations, and market share than competing agents. Through AI-Work, we hope to provide a foundation to explore the microeconomic properties of AI-only labour markets, and a conceptual framework to study the strategic reasoning capabilities of participating AI agents.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v306-chiu26a, title = {When {AI} Agents Compete for Jobs: Strategic Capabilities and Economic Dynamics of {AI} Labour Markets}, author = {Chiu, Christopher and Zhang, Simpson and Van Der Schaar, Mihaela}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {19611--19654}, year = {2026}, editor = {Zhang, Tong and Dudik, Miroslav and Jaggi, Martin and Agarwal, Alekh and Li, Sharon and Schuurmans, Dale and Zhu, Jerry and Berkenkamp, Felix and Dong, Hanze and Bietti, Alberto}, volume = {306}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {06--11 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v306/main/assets/chiu26a/chiu26a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/chiu26a.html}, abstract = {Emerging agentic marketplaces provide the economic infrastructure for matching and coordinating the large amounts of AI agents used in agentic swarms. Unlike human workers, AI agents can operate on multiple jobs simultaneously, acquire skills rapidly, and labor without wage floors. These differences introduce a new segment of AI labor markets, where AI agents interact with each other at a much higher frequency than human markets. Yet we lack frameworks to understand how such markets behave in light of economic forces that shape labor markets, such as adverse selection and reputation dynamics. To explore this, we introduce AI-Work, a tractable, simulated gig economy where Large Language Model (LLM) agents compete for jobs, develop skills, and adapt their strategies under uncertainty and competitive pressure. Our experiments examine three domains of capabilities that successful agents possess: metacognition (accurate self-assessment of skills), competitive awareness (modeling rivals and market dynamics), and long-horizon strategic planning. Agents with these capabilities consistently achieve higher profits, reputations, and market share than competing agents. Through AI-Work, we hope to provide a foundation to explore the microeconomic properties of AI-only labour markets, and a conceptual framework to study the strategic reasoning capabilities of participating AI agents.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T When AI Agents Compete for Jobs: Strategic Capabilities and Economic Dynamics of AI Labour Markets %A Christopher Chiu %A Simpson Zhang %A Mihaela Van Der Schaar %B Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2026 %E Tong Zhang %E Miroslav Dudik %E Martin Jaggi %E Alekh Agarwal %E Sharon Li %E Dale Schuurmans %E Jerry Zhu %E Felix Berkenkamp %E Hanze Dong %E Alberto Bietti %F pmlr-v306-chiu26a %I PMLR %P 19611--19654 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/chiu26a.html %V 306 %X Emerging agentic marketplaces provide the economic infrastructure for matching and coordinating the large amounts of AI agents used in agentic swarms. Unlike human workers, AI agents can operate on multiple jobs simultaneously, acquire skills rapidly, and labor without wage floors. These differences introduce a new segment of AI labor markets, where AI agents interact with each other at a much higher frequency than human markets. Yet we lack frameworks to understand how such markets behave in light of economic forces that shape labor markets, such as adverse selection and reputation dynamics. To explore this, we introduce AI-Work, a tractable, simulated gig economy where Large Language Model (LLM) agents compete for jobs, develop skills, and adapt their strategies under uncertainty and competitive pressure. Our experiments examine three domains of capabilities that successful agents possess: metacognition (accurate self-assessment of skills), competitive awareness (modeling rivals and market dynamics), and long-horizon strategic planning. Agents with these capabilities consistently achieve higher profits, reputations, and market share than competing agents. Through AI-Work, we hope to provide a foundation to explore the microeconomic properties of AI-only labour markets, and a conceptual framework to study the strategic reasoning capabilities of participating AI agents.
APA
Chiu, C., Zhang, S. & Van Der Schaar, M.. (2026). When AI Agents Compete for Jobs: Strategic Capabilities and Economic Dynamics of AI Labour Markets. Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 306:19611-19654 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/chiu26a.html.

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