Computational Arbitrage in AI Model Markets

Ricardo Olmedo, Bernhard Schölkopf, Moritz Hardt
Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 306:94640-94655, 2026.

Abstract

Consider a market of competing model providers selling query access to models with varying costs and capabilities. Customers submit problem instances and are willing to pay up to a budget for a verifiable solution. An arbitrageur efficiently allocates inference budget across providers to undercut the market, thus creating a competitive offering with no model-development risk. In this work, we initiate the study of arbitrage in AI model markets, empirically demonstrating the viability of arbitrage and illustrating its economic consequences. We conduct an in-depth case study of SWE-bench GitHub issue resolution using two representative models, GPT-5 mini and DeepSeek v3.2. In this verifiable domain, simple arbitrage strategies generate net profit margins of up to 40%. Robust arbitrage strategies that generalize across different domains remain profitable. Distillation further creates strong arbitrage opportunities, potentially at the expense of the teacher model’s revenue. Multiple competing arbitrageurs drive down consumer prices, reducing the marginal revenue of model providers. At the same time, arbitrage reduces market segmentation and facilitates market entry for smaller model providers by enabling earlier revenue capture. Our results suggest that arbitrage can be a powerful force in AI model markets with implications for model development, distillation, and deployment.

Cite this Paper


BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v306-olmedo26a, title = {Computational Arbitrage in {AI} Model Markets}, author = {Olmedo, Ricardo and Sch\"{o}lkopf, Bernhard and Hardt, Moritz}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {94640--94655}, year = {2026}, editor = {Zhang, Tong and Dudik, Miroslav and Jaggi, Martin and Agarwal, Alekh and Li, Sharon and Schuurmans, Dale and Zhu, Jerry and Berkenkamp, Felix and Dong, Hanze and Bietti, Alberto}, volume = {306}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {06--11 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v306/main/assets/olmedo26a/olmedo26a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/olmedo26a.html}, abstract = {Consider a market of competing model providers selling query access to models with varying costs and capabilities. Customers submit problem instances and are willing to pay up to a budget for a verifiable solution. An arbitrageur efficiently allocates inference budget across providers to undercut the market, thus creating a competitive offering with no model-development risk. In this work, we initiate the study of arbitrage in AI model markets, empirically demonstrating the viability of arbitrage and illustrating its economic consequences. We conduct an in-depth case study of SWE-bench GitHub issue resolution using two representative models, GPT-5 mini and DeepSeek v3.2. In this verifiable domain, simple arbitrage strategies generate net profit margins of up to 40%. Robust arbitrage strategies that generalize across different domains remain profitable. Distillation further creates strong arbitrage opportunities, potentially at the expense of the teacher model’s revenue. Multiple competing arbitrageurs drive down consumer prices, reducing the marginal revenue of model providers. At the same time, arbitrage reduces market segmentation and facilitates market entry for smaller model providers by enabling earlier revenue capture. Our results suggest that arbitrage can be a powerful force in AI model markets with implications for model development, distillation, and deployment.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Computational Arbitrage in AI Model Markets %A Ricardo Olmedo %A Bernhard Schölkopf %A Moritz Hardt %B Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2026 %E Tong Zhang %E Miroslav Dudik %E Martin Jaggi %E Alekh Agarwal %E Sharon Li %E Dale Schuurmans %E Jerry Zhu %E Felix Berkenkamp %E Hanze Dong %E Alberto Bietti %F pmlr-v306-olmedo26a %I PMLR %P 94640--94655 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/olmedo26a.html %V 306 %X Consider a market of competing model providers selling query access to models with varying costs and capabilities. Customers submit problem instances and are willing to pay up to a budget for a verifiable solution. An arbitrageur efficiently allocates inference budget across providers to undercut the market, thus creating a competitive offering with no model-development risk. In this work, we initiate the study of arbitrage in AI model markets, empirically demonstrating the viability of arbitrage and illustrating its economic consequences. We conduct an in-depth case study of SWE-bench GitHub issue resolution using two representative models, GPT-5 mini and DeepSeek v3.2. In this verifiable domain, simple arbitrage strategies generate net profit margins of up to 40%. Robust arbitrage strategies that generalize across different domains remain profitable. Distillation further creates strong arbitrage opportunities, potentially at the expense of the teacher model’s revenue. Multiple competing arbitrageurs drive down consumer prices, reducing the marginal revenue of model providers. At the same time, arbitrage reduces market segmentation and facilitates market entry for smaller model providers by enabling earlier revenue capture. Our results suggest that arbitrage can be a powerful force in AI model markets with implications for model development, distillation, and deployment.
APA
Olmedo, R., Schölkopf, B. & Hardt, M.. (2026). Computational Arbitrage in AI Model Markets. Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 306:94640-94655 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/olmedo26a.html.

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