The Oversight Game: Learning to Cooperatively Balance an AI Agent’s Safety and Autonomy

William Overman, Mohsen Bayati
Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 306:95380-95413, 2026.

Abstract

As increasingly capable agents are deployed, a central safety challenge is how to retain meaningful human control without modifying the underlying system. We study a minimal control interface in which an agent chooses whether to act autonomously (play) or defer (ask), while a human simultaneously chooses whether to be permissive (trust) or engage in oversight (oversee), and model this interaction as a two-player Markov Game. When this game forms a Markov Potential Game, we prove an alignment guarantee: any increase in the agent’s utility from acting more autonomously cannot decrease the human’s value. This establishes a form of intrinsic alignment where the agent’s incentive to seek autonomy is structurally coupled to the human’s welfare. Practically, the framework induces a transparent control layer encouraging the agent to defer when risky and act when safe. While we use gridworld simulations to illustrate the emergence of this collaboration, our primary validation involves an agentic tool-use task where two 30B-parameter language models are fine-tuned via independent policy gradient. We demonstrate that even as the agents learn to coordinate on the fly, this framework effectively reduces safety violations in realistic, open-ended environments.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v306-overman26b, title = {The Oversight Game: Learning to Cooperatively Balance an {AI} Agent’s Safety and Autonomy}, author = {Overman, William and Bayati, Mohsen}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {95380--95413}, year = {2026}, editor = {Zhang, Tong and Dudik, Miroslav and Jaggi, Martin and Agarwal, Alekh and Li, Sharon and Schuurmans, Dale and Zhu, Jerry and Berkenkamp, Felix and Dong, Hanze and Bietti, Alberto}, volume = {306}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {06--11 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v306/main/assets/overman26b/overman26b.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/overman26b.html}, abstract = {As increasingly capable agents are deployed, a central safety challenge is how to retain meaningful human control without modifying the underlying system. We study a minimal control interface in which an agent chooses whether to act autonomously (play) or defer (ask), while a human simultaneously chooses whether to be permissive (trust) or engage in oversight (oversee), and model this interaction as a two-player Markov Game. When this game forms a Markov Potential Game, we prove an alignment guarantee: any increase in the agent’s utility from acting more autonomously cannot decrease the human’s value. This establishes a form of intrinsic alignment where the agent’s incentive to seek autonomy is structurally coupled to the human’s welfare. Practically, the framework induces a transparent control layer encouraging the agent to defer when risky and act when safe. While we use gridworld simulations to illustrate the emergence of this collaboration, our primary validation involves an agentic tool-use task where two 30B-parameter language models are fine-tuned via independent policy gradient. We demonstrate that even as the agents learn to coordinate on the fly, this framework effectively reduces safety violations in realistic, open-ended environments.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T The Oversight Game: Learning to Cooperatively Balance an AI Agent’s Safety and Autonomy %A William Overman %A Mohsen Bayati %B Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2026 %E Tong Zhang %E Miroslav Dudik %E Martin Jaggi %E Alekh Agarwal %E Sharon Li %E Dale Schuurmans %E Jerry Zhu %E Felix Berkenkamp %E Hanze Dong %E Alberto Bietti %F pmlr-v306-overman26b %I PMLR %P 95380--95413 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/overman26b.html %V 306 %X As increasingly capable agents are deployed, a central safety challenge is how to retain meaningful human control without modifying the underlying system. We study a minimal control interface in which an agent chooses whether to act autonomously (play) or defer (ask), while a human simultaneously chooses whether to be permissive (trust) or engage in oversight (oversee), and model this interaction as a two-player Markov Game. When this game forms a Markov Potential Game, we prove an alignment guarantee: any increase in the agent’s utility from acting more autonomously cannot decrease the human’s value. This establishes a form of intrinsic alignment where the agent’s incentive to seek autonomy is structurally coupled to the human’s welfare. Practically, the framework induces a transparent control layer encouraging the agent to defer when risky and act when safe. While we use gridworld simulations to illustrate the emergence of this collaboration, our primary validation involves an agentic tool-use task where two 30B-parameter language models are fine-tuned via independent policy gradient. We demonstrate that even as the agents learn to coordinate on the fly, this framework effectively reduces safety violations in realistic, open-ended environments.
APA
Overman, W. & Bayati, M.. (2026). The Oversight Game: Learning to Cooperatively Balance an AI Agent’s Safety and Autonomy. Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 306:95380-95413 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/overman26b.html.

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