Equilibrium Pricing in Oligopolistic Data Markets

Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Jiaxin Song
Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 306:104068-104077, 2026.

Abstract

We study equilibrium pricing in oligopolistic data markets with budget-constrained buyers (e.g., ML companies purchasing data to improve model accuracy) and strategic data sellers. Sellers compete by setting prices for their datasets, giving rise to a pricing game whose pure Nash equilibria correspond to equilibrium prices. While equilibrium prices are guaranteed for rivalrous goods via competitive equilibrium, we show that the non-rivalry of data fundamentally alters this picture: an exact Nash equilibrium need not exist, and in fact no 1.364-approximate equilibrium exists under uniform pricing. We therefore investigate relaxed equilibrium notions. Allowing sellers to use beyond-uniform pricing—specifically, piecewise-linear convex pricing functions—guarantees approximate stability within a constant factor: there exists a pricing profile in which no seller can improve revenue by a factor of two by deviating to any uniform price (a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium). Finally, our simulations demonstrate fast convergence and empirical approximation guarantees that outperform the worst-case bound of 2.

Cite this Paper


BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v306-ray-chaudhury26a, title = {Equilibrium Pricing in Oligopolistic Data Markets}, author = {Ray Chaudhury, Bhaskar and Garg, Jugal and Sharma, Eklavya and Song, Jiaxin}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {104068--104077}, year = {2026}, editor = {Zhang, Tong and Dudik, Miroslav and Jaggi, Martin and Agarwal, Alekh and Li, Sharon and Schuurmans, Dale and Zhu, Jerry and Berkenkamp, Felix and Dong, Hanze and Bietti, Alberto}, volume = {306}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {06--11 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v306/main/assets/ray-chaudhury26a/ray-chaudhury26a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/ray-chaudhury26a.html}, abstract = {We study equilibrium pricing in oligopolistic data markets with budget-constrained buyers (e.g., ML companies purchasing data to improve model accuracy) and strategic data sellers. Sellers compete by setting prices for their datasets, giving rise to a pricing game whose pure Nash equilibria correspond to equilibrium prices. While equilibrium prices are guaranteed for rivalrous goods via competitive equilibrium, we show that the non-rivalry of data fundamentally alters this picture: an exact Nash equilibrium need not exist, and in fact no 1.364-approximate equilibrium exists under uniform pricing. We therefore investigate relaxed equilibrium notions. Allowing sellers to use beyond-uniform pricing—specifically, piecewise-linear convex pricing functions—guarantees approximate stability within a constant factor: there exists a pricing profile in which no seller can improve revenue by a factor of two by deviating to any uniform price (a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium). Finally, our simulations demonstrate fast convergence and empirical approximation guarantees that outperform the worst-case bound of 2.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Equilibrium Pricing in Oligopolistic Data Markets %A Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury %A Jugal Garg %A Eklavya Sharma %A Jiaxin Song %B Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2026 %E Tong Zhang %E Miroslav Dudik %E Martin Jaggi %E Alekh Agarwal %E Sharon Li %E Dale Schuurmans %E Jerry Zhu %E Felix Berkenkamp %E Hanze Dong %E Alberto Bietti %F pmlr-v306-ray-chaudhury26a %I PMLR %P 104068--104077 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/ray-chaudhury26a.html %V 306 %X We study equilibrium pricing in oligopolistic data markets with budget-constrained buyers (e.g., ML companies purchasing data to improve model accuracy) and strategic data sellers. Sellers compete by setting prices for their datasets, giving rise to a pricing game whose pure Nash equilibria correspond to equilibrium prices. While equilibrium prices are guaranteed for rivalrous goods via competitive equilibrium, we show that the non-rivalry of data fundamentally alters this picture: an exact Nash equilibrium need not exist, and in fact no 1.364-approximate equilibrium exists under uniform pricing. We therefore investigate relaxed equilibrium notions. Allowing sellers to use beyond-uniform pricing—specifically, piecewise-linear convex pricing functions—guarantees approximate stability within a constant factor: there exists a pricing profile in which no seller can improve revenue by a factor of two by deviating to any uniform price (a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium). Finally, our simulations demonstrate fast convergence and empirical approximation guarantees that outperform the worst-case bound of 2.
APA
Ray Chaudhury, B., Garg, J., Sharma, E. & Song, J.. (2026). Equilibrium Pricing in Oligopolistic Data Markets. Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 306:104068-104077 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/ray-chaudhury26a.html.

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