Position: LLMs can’t jump

Tom Zahavy
Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 306:172863-172872, 2026.

Abstract

How do we fundamentally discover new things? In a letter to Maurice Solovine, Albert Einstein conceptualized discovery as a cyclical process involving an intuitive ’jump’ from sensory experience to axioms, followed by logical deduction. While Generative AI has mastered Induction (statistical pattern matching) and is rapidly conquering Deduction (formal proof), we argue it lacks the mechanism for Abduction—the generation of novel explanatory hypotheses. Using Einstein’s formulation of General Relativity as a computational case study, we demonstrate that the prevailing theory of "creativity as data compression" (induction) fails to account for discoveries where observational data is scarce. This position paper argues that while a modern Large Language Model could plausibly execute the deductive phase of proving theorems from established premises, it is structurally incapable of the abductive ’Jump’ required to formulate those premises. We identify the translation of simulation into formal axioms as the critical bottleneck in artificial scientific invention, and propose that physically consistent, multimodal world models offer the necessary sensory grounding to bridge this divide.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v306-zahavy26a, title = {Position: {LLM}s can’t jump}, author = {Zahavy, Tom}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {172863--172872}, year = {2026}, editor = {Zhang, Tong and Dudik, Miroslav and Jaggi, Martin and Agarwal, Alekh and Li, Sharon and Schuurmans, Dale and Zhu, Jerry and Berkenkamp, Felix and Dong, Hanze and Bietti, Alberto}, volume = {306}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {06--11 Jul}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v306/main/assets/zahavy26a/zahavy26a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/zahavy26a.html}, abstract = {How do we fundamentally discover new things? In a letter to Maurice Solovine, Albert Einstein conceptualized discovery as a cyclical process involving an intuitive ’jump’ from sensory experience to axioms, followed by logical deduction. While Generative AI has mastered Induction (statistical pattern matching) and is rapidly conquering Deduction (formal proof), we argue it lacks the mechanism for Abduction—the generation of novel explanatory hypotheses. Using Einstein’s formulation of General Relativity as a computational case study, we demonstrate that the prevailing theory of "creativity as data compression" (induction) fails to account for discoveries where observational data is scarce. This position paper argues that while a modern Large Language Model could plausibly execute the deductive phase of proving theorems from established premises, it is structurally incapable of the abductive ’Jump’ required to formulate those premises. We identify the translation of simulation into formal axioms as the critical bottleneck in artificial scientific invention, and propose that physically consistent, multimodal world models offer the necessary sensory grounding to bridge this divide.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Position: LLMs can’t jump %A Tom Zahavy %B Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2026 %E Tong Zhang %E Miroslav Dudik %E Martin Jaggi %E Alekh Agarwal %E Sharon Li %E Dale Schuurmans %E Jerry Zhu %E Felix Berkenkamp %E Hanze Dong %E Alberto Bietti %F pmlr-v306-zahavy26a %I PMLR %P 172863--172872 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/zahavy26a.html %V 306 %X How do we fundamentally discover new things? In a letter to Maurice Solovine, Albert Einstein conceptualized discovery as a cyclical process involving an intuitive ’jump’ from sensory experience to axioms, followed by logical deduction. While Generative AI has mastered Induction (statistical pattern matching) and is rapidly conquering Deduction (formal proof), we argue it lacks the mechanism for Abduction—the generation of novel explanatory hypotheses. Using Einstein’s formulation of General Relativity as a computational case study, we demonstrate that the prevailing theory of "creativity as data compression" (induction) fails to account for discoveries where observational data is scarce. This position paper argues that while a modern Large Language Model could plausibly execute the deductive phase of proving theorems from established premises, it is structurally incapable of the abductive ’Jump’ required to formulate those premises. We identify the translation of simulation into formal axioms as the critical bottleneck in artificial scientific invention, and propose that physically consistent, multimodal world models offer the necessary sensory grounding to bridge this divide.
APA
Zahavy, T.. (2026). Position: LLMs can’t jump. Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 306:172863-172872 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v306/zahavy26a.html.

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