Near Optimal Convergence to Coarse Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games

Asrin Efe Yorulmaz, Tamer Basar
Proceedings of The 8th Annual Learning for Dynamics and Control Conference, PMLR 331:316-345, 2026.

Abstract

No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the convergence rate to CCE in general-sum Markov games, reducing it from the previously best-known rate of $\mathcal{O}(\log^5 T / T)$ to a sharper $\mathcal{O}(\log T / T)$. This matches the best known convergence rate for CE in terms of $T$, number of iterations, while also improving the dependence on the action set size from polynomial to polylogarithmic—yielding exponential gains in high-dimensional settings. Our approach builds on recent advances in adaptive step-size techniques for no-regret algorithms in normal-form games, and extends them to the Markovian setting via a stage-wise scheme that adjusts learning rates based on real-time feedback. We frame policy updates as an instance of Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (OFTRL), customized for value-iteration-based learning. The resulting self-play algorithm achieves, to our knowledge, the fastest known convergence rate to CCE in Markov games.

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v331-yorulmaz26a, title = {Near Optimal Convergence to Coarse Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games}, author = {Yorulmaz, Asrin Efe and Basar, Tamer}, booktitle = {Proceedings of The 8th Annual Learning for Dynamics and Control Conference}, pages = {316--345}, year = {2026}, editor = {Sukhatme, Gaurav and Lindemann, Lars and Tu, Stephen and Wierman, Adam and Atanasov, Nikolay}, volume = {331}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {17--19 Jun}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mlresearch/v331/main/assets/yorulmaz26a/yorulmaz26a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v331/yorulmaz26a.html}, abstract = {No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the convergence rate to CCE in general-sum Markov games, reducing it from the previously best-known rate of $\mathcal{O}(\log^5 T / T)$ to a sharper $\mathcal{O}(\log T / T)$. This matches the best known convergence rate for CE in terms of $T$, number of iterations, while also improving the dependence on the action set size from polynomial to polylogarithmic—yielding exponential gains in high-dimensional settings. Our approach builds on recent advances in adaptive step-size techniques for no-regret algorithms in normal-form games, and extends them to the Markovian setting via a stage-wise scheme that adjusts learning rates based on real-time feedback. We frame policy updates as an instance of Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (OFTRL), customized for value-iteration-based learning. The resulting self-play algorithm achieves, to our knowledge, the fastest known convergence rate to CCE in Markov games.} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Near Optimal Convergence to Coarse Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games %A Asrin Efe Yorulmaz %A Tamer Basar %B Proceedings of The 8th Annual Learning for Dynamics and Control Conference %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2026 %E Gaurav Sukhatme %E Lars Lindemann %E Stephen Tu %E Adam Wierman %E Nikolay Atanasov %F pmlr-v331-yorulmaz26a %I PMLR %P 316--345 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v331/yorulmaz26a.html %V 331 %X No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the convergence rate to CCE in general-sum Markov games, reducing it from the previously best-known rate of $\mathcal{O}(\log^5 T / T)$ to a sharper $\mathcal{O}(\log T / T)$. This matches the best known convergence rate for CE in terms of $T$, number of iterations, while also improving the dependence on the action set size from polynomial to polylogarithmic—yielding exponential gains in high-dimensional settings. Our approach builds on recent advances in adaptive step-size techniques for no-regret algorithms in normal-form games, and extends them to the Markovian setting via a stage-wise scheme that adjusts learning rates based on real-time feedback. We frame policy updates as an instance of Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (OFTRL), customized for value-iteration-based learning. The resulting self-play algorithm achieves, to our knowledge, the fastest known convergence rate to CCE in Markov games.
APA
Yorulmaz, A.E. & Basar, T.. (2026). Near Optimal Convergence to Coarse Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games. Proceedings of The 8th Annual Learning for Dynamics and Control Conference, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 331:316-345 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v331/yorulmaz26a.html.

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