Adversarial camera stickers: A physical camera-based attack on deep learning systems

Juncheng Li, Frank Schmidt, Zico Kolter
Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 97:3896-3904, 2019.

Abstract

Recent work has documented the susceptibility of deep learning systems to adversarial examples, but most such attacks directly manipulate the digital input to a classifier. Although a smaller line of work considers physical adversarial attacks, in all cases these involve manipulating the object of interest, e.g., putting a physical sticker on an object to misclassify it, or manufacturing an object specifically intended to be misclassified. In this work, we consider an alternative question: is it possible to fool deep classifiers, over all perceived objects of a certain type, by physically manipulating the camera itself? We show that by placing a carefully crafted and mainly-translucent sticker over the lens of a camera, one can create universal perturbations of the observed images that are inconspicuous, yet misclassify target objects as a different (targeted) class. To accomplish this, we propose an iterative procedure for both updating the attack perturbation (to make it adversarial for a given classifier), and the threat model itself (to ensure it is physically realizable). For example, we show that we can achieve physically-realizable attacks that fool ImageNet classifiers in a targeted fashion 49.6% of the time. This presents a new class of physically-realizable threat models to consider in the context of adversarially robust machine learning. Our demo video can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/wUVmL33Fx54

Cite this Paper

BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v97-li19j, title = {Adversarial camera stickers: A physical camera-based attack on deep learning systems}, author = {Li, Juncheng and Schmidt, Frank and Kolter, Zico}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning}, pages = {3896--3904}, year = {2019}, editor = {Chaudhuri, Kamalika and Salakhutdinov, Ruslan}, volume = {97}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {09--15 Jun}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {http://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/li19j/li19j.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/li19j.html}, abstract = {Recent work has documented the susceptibility of deep learning systems to adversarial examples, but most such attacks directly manipulate the digital input to a classifier. Although a smaller line of work considers physical adversarial attacks, in all cases these involve manipulating the object of interest, e.g., putting a physical sticker on an object to misclassify it, or manufacturing an object specifically intended to be misclassified. In this work, we consider an alternative question: is it possible to fool deep classifiers, over all perceived objects of a certain type, by physically manipulating the camera itself? We show that by placing a carefully crafted and mainly-translucent sticker over the lens of a camera, one can create universal perturbations of the observed images that are inconspicuous, yet misclassify target objects as a different (targeted) class. To accomplish this, we propose an iterative procedure for both updating the attack perturbation (to make it adversarial for a given classifier), and the threat model itself (to ensure it is physically realizable). For example, we show that we can achieve physically-realizable attacks that fool ImageNet classifiers in a targeted fashion 49.6% of the time. This presents a new class of physically-realizable threat models to consider in the context of adversarially robust machine learning. Our demo video can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/wUVmL33Fx54} }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Adversarial camera stickers: A physical camera-based attack on deep learning systems %A Juncheng Li %A Frank Schmidt %A Zico Kolter %B Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2019 %E Kamalika Chaudhuri %E Ruslan Salakhutdinov %F pmlr-v97-li19j %I PMLR %P 3896--3904 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/li19j.html %V 97 %X Recent work has documented the susceptibility of deep learning systems to adversarial examples, but most such attacks directly manipulate the digital input to a classifier. Although a smaller line of work considers physical adversarial attacks, in all cases these involve manipulating the object of interest, e.g., putting a physical sticker on an object to misclassify it, or manufacturing an object specifically intended to be misclassified. In this work, we consider an alternative question: is it possible to fool deep classifiers, over all perceived objects of a certain type, by physically manipulating the camera itself? We show that by placing a carefully crafted and mainly-translucent sticker over the lens of a camera, one can create universal perturbations of the observed images that are inconspicuous, yet misclassify target objects as a different (targeted) class. To accomplish this, we propose an iterative procedure for both updating the attack perturbation (to make it adversarial for a given classifier), and the threat model itself (to ensure it is physically realizable). For example, we show that we can achieve physically-realizable attacks that fool ImageNet classifiers in a targeted fashion 49.6% of the time. This presents a new class of physically-realizable threat models to consider in the context of adversarially robust machine learning. Our demo video can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/wUVmL33Fx54
APA
Li, J., Schmidt, F. & Kolter, Z.. (2019). Adversarial camera stickers: A physical camera-based attack on deep learning systems. Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 97:3896-3904 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/li19j.html.

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