Finding First-Order Nash Equilibria of Zero-Sum Games with the Regularized Nikaido-Isoda Function

Ioannis Tsaknakis, Mingyi Hong
Proceedings of The 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, PMLR 130:1189-1197, 2021.

Abstract

Efficiently finding First-order Nash Equilibria (FNE) in zero-sum games can be challenging, even in a two-player setting. This work proposes an algorithm for finding the FNEs of a two-player zero-sum game, in which the local cost functions can be non-convex, and the players only have access to local stochastic gradients. The proposed approach is based on reformulating the problem of interest as minimizing the Regularized Nikaido-Isoda (RNI) function. We show that the global minima of the RNI correspond to the set of FNEs, and that for certain classes of non-convex games the RNI minimization problem becomes convex. Moreover, we introduce a first-order (stochastic) optimization method, and establish its convergence to a neighborhood of a stationary solution of the RNI objective. The key in the analysis is to properly control the bias between the local stochastic gradient and the true one. Although the RNI function has been used in analyzing convex games, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the properties of the RNI formulation have been exploited to find FNEs for non-convex games in a stochastic setting.

Cite this Paper


BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v130-tsaknakis21a, title = { Finding First-Order Nash Equilibria of Zero-Sum Games with the Regularized Nikaido-Isoda Function }, author = {Tsaknakis, Ioannis and Hong, Mingyi}, booktitle = {Proceedings of The 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics}, pages = {1189--1197}, year = {2021}, editor = {Banerjee, Arindam and Fukumizu, Kenji}, volume = {130}, series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research}, month = {13--15 Apr}, publisher = {PMLR}, pdf = {http://proceedings.mlr.press/v130/tsaknakis21a/tsaknakis21a.pdf}, url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v130/tsaknakis21a.html}, abstract = { Efficiently finding First-order Nash Equilibria (FNE) in zero-sum games can be challenging, even in a two-player setting. This work proposes an algorithm for finding the FNEs of a two-player zero-sum game, in which the local cost functions can be non-convex, and the players only have access to local stochastic gradients. The proposed approach is based on reformulating the problem of interest as minimizing the Regularized Nikaido-Isoda (RNI) function. We show that the global minima of the RNI correspond to the set of FNEs, and that for certain classes of non-convex games the RNI minimization problem becomes convex. Moreover, we introduce a first-order (stochastic) optimization method, and establish its convergence to a neighborhood of a stationary solution of the RNI objective. The key in the analysis is to properly control the bias between the local stochastic gradient and the true one. Although the RNI function has been used in analyzing convex games, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the properties of the RNI formulation have been exploited to find FNEs for non-convex games in a stochastic setting. } }
Endnote
%0 Conference Paper %T Finding First-Order Nash Equilibria of Zero-Sum Games with the Regularized Nikaido-Isoda Function %A Ioannis Tsaknakis %A Mingyi Hong %B Proceedings of The 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics %C Proceedings of Machine Learning Research %D 2021 %E Arindam Banerjee %E Kenji Fukumizu %F pmlr-v130-tsaknakis21a %I PMLR %P 1189--1197 %U https://proceedings.mlr.press/v130/tsaknakis21a.html %V 130 %X Efficiently finding First-order Nash Equilibria (FNE) in zero-sum games can be challenging, even in a two-player setting. This work proposes an algorithm for finding the FNEs of a two-player zero-sum game, in which the local cost functions can be non-convex, and the players only have access to local stochastic gradients. The proposed approach is based on reformulating the problem of interest as minimizing the Regularized Nikaido-Isoda (RNI) function. We show that the global minima of the RNI correspond to the set of FNEs, and that for certain classes of non-convex games the RNI minimization problem becomes convex. Moreover, we introduce a first-order (stochastic) optimization method, and establish its convergence to a neighborhood of a stationary solution of the RNI objective. The key in the analysis is to properly control the bias between the local stochastic gradient and the true one. Although the RNI function has been used in analyzing convex games, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the properties of the RNI formulation have been exploited to find FNEs for non-convex games in a stochastic setting.
APA
Tsaknakis, I. & Hong, M.. (2021). Finding First-Order Nash Equilibria of Zero-Sum Games with the Regularized Nikaido-Isoda Function . Proceedings of The 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 130:1189-1197 Available from https://proceedings.mlr.press/v130/tsaknakis21a.html.

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